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Article 
The Public Cost of Private Equity 
William Magnuson† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The rise of private equity over the past decade has raised a 
number of important questions about corporate governance, 
stakeholder rights, and the role of corporate law in managing 
and regulating the fast-changing world of business. Critics of the 
industry have lamented that private equity firms destroy com-
panies by layering on debt, firing employees, and cutting costs 
at every opportunity.1 Proponents respond that any changes 
they make to companies—and they dispute the charges about 
destroying jobs2—are painful but necessary remedies to improve 
the inefficient and bloated companies that they acquire.3 In the 
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 1. E.g., Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, Romney’s Bain Yielded Private Gain, 
Public Loss, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 16, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
view/articles/2012-07-15/romney-s-bain-yielded-private-gains-socialized-losses; 
Danielle Ivory et al., When You Dial 911 and Wall Street Answers, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (June 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/business/ 
dealbook/when-you-dial-911-and-wall-street-answers.html; Private Equity: The 
Barbarian Establishment, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.economist 
.com/news/briefing/21709007-private-equity-has-prospered-while-almost-every 
-other-approach-business-has-stumbled. 
 2. E.g., ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & NAM D. PHAM, AMERICAN JOBS AND THE IM-
PACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS 9 (2008), http://www.sonecon.com/ 
docs/studies/0108_JobsPrivateEquityTransactions.pdf; Steven J. Davis et al., 
Private Equity, Jobs, and Productivity, 104 SONECON 3956, 3987–88 (2014); 
Grace Wong, Private Equity and the Job Cut Myth, CNN MONEY (May 2, 2007), 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/02/markets/pe_jobs/index.htm. 
 3. E.g., Felix Barber & Michael Goold, The Strategic Secret of Private Eq-
uity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2007), https://www.hbr.org/2007/09/the-strategic 
-secret-of-private-equity; Herb Engert, Private Equity’s Value Creation Secrets, 
FORBES (June 25, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ey/2014/06/25/private 
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face of these controversies, private equity has continued to pros-
per: new firms are opening up at a rapid pace, money is flowing 
into the industry, and private equity compensation remains 
stratospheric.4  
Conventional wisdom holds that private equity has resolved, 
or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental ten-
sions in corporate law: the conflict between management and 
ownership.5 According to this line of thought, private equity 
 
-equitys-value-creation-secrets/#230ba35519d0; Steven N. Kaplan, How To 
Think about Private Equity, AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.aei 
.org/publication/how-to-think-about-private-equity; Dan McCrum, Blackstone 
Chief Hits Out at Attacks on Sector, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), https://www.ft 
.com/content/34bc99de-4da7-11e1-bb6c-00144feabdc0. 
 4. The number of active private equity firms has increased 143% since 
2000, and 620 new firms were founded in 2015 alone. Number of Active PE 
Firms Up 143% Since 2000: A Global Breakdown, PITCHBOOK (June 10, 2015), 
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/number-of-active-pe-firms-up-143-since 
-2000-a-global-breakdown; Private Equity: The Barbarian Establishment, supra 
note 1. Since 2013, private equity funds have raised $500 billion annually, with 
Bain & Company concluding that “[t]he past year saw the best environment for 
fund-raising since the precrash boom.” BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY 
REPORT 2016, at iii (2016), http://www.bain.com/Images/Bain_and_Company_ 
Global_Private_Equity_Report_2016.pdf. And the top private equity managers 
continue to earn tremendous sums: Steve Schwarzman of the Blackstone Group 
is estimated to have earned $690 million in 2014, while Leon Black of Apollo 
Global Management received $330 million. William Alden, Leon Black of Apollo 
Global Got $331 Million Payout in 2014, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/business/dealbook/leon-black-of-apollo 
-global-got-331-million-payout-in-2014.html; Ryan Dezember, Blackstone 
Group CEO Collected $690 Million In 2014, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2015), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/blackstone-group-ceo-took-home-690-million-in-2014 
-1425078294. 
 5. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 222–
25 (2010) (outlining the advantages that private equity’s governance structure 
has over public company structures); Scott J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules 
for Director Selection and Liability Help Public Companies Gain Some of Private 
Equity’s Advantages?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 85 (2009) (stating that the greater 
contact between owners and management in private equity governance struc-
tures “helps PE Portfolio Companies solve one of the central problems of public 
corporations: the inability of widely dispersed equity owners to adequately en-
sure that management is competent, is not running the company for its own 
benefit, and is not committing fraud”); Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. White-
head, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete 
Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 252 (2008) (stating that “private eq-
uity ownership align[s] management and shareholder incentives”); Michael C. 
Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986) [hereinafter Jensen, Agency Costs] (arguing 
that private equity’s debt structure creates incentives for managers to run their 
companies more efficiently); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corpora-
tion, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 61, 61–62 [hereinafter Jensen, 
Eclipse] (arguing that private equity firms “resolv[e] the central weakness of 
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firms’ corporate-governance structure enables them to manage 
companies better through (1) creating strong financial incentives 
for managers to improve company performance metrics;6 (2) 
closely and actively monitoring management behavior;7 and (3) 
deploying deep industry, capital market, and financial expertise 
in support of these mechanisms.8 Taken together, these govern-
ing arrangements supposedly create a virtuous cycle of mutually 
 
the large public corporation—the conflict between owners and managers over 
the control and use of corporate resources” and, as a result, “mak[e] remarkable 
gains in operating efficiency, employee productivity, and shareholder value”); 
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 
J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 121–22 (2009) (describing the changes in corporate gov-
ernance that private equity firms institute in their portfolio companies and con-
cluding that, on average, private equity activity creates economic value); Ronald 
W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Ef-
fects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 219, 219 (2009) (arguing that a large part of private equity’s success is 
“due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over those of the 
public corporation”); Joachim Heel & Conor Kehoe, Why Some Private Equity 
Firms Do Better Than Others, MCKINSEY Q. (Feb. 2005), http://www.mckinsey 
.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/why-some 
-private-equity-firms-do-better-than-others (outlining the key governance 
changes that private equity firms make to create value in their portfolio compa-
nies). 
 6. E.g., Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating 
Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 250–51 (1989) (concluding that 
the improvements in operating performance that portfolio companies experi-
ence after take-private transactions is caused by improved incentives for man-
agers and, in particular, larger equity holdings by managers); Jensen, Agency 
Costs, supra note 5 (arguing that the heavy debt loads carried by private equity 
portfolio companies reduce incentives for opportunism by managers); Kaplan & 
Strömberg, supra note 5, at 135 (arguing that managers of private equity port-
folio companies face strong pressure to succeed by the knowledge that private 
equity firms are quick to fire underperforming managers). 
 7. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 227–30 (noting that one source of 
agency-cost reductions in private equity transactions is improved board moni-
toring of management); Francesca Cornelli & Ōguzhan Karakas, Private Equity 
and Corporate Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards?, in 1 THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS WORKING PAPERS VOLUME 1: 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2008, at 65, 68–73 
(World Econ. Forum, 2008), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/pdf/WorldEconomic 
ForumGlobalEconomicImpactOfPrivateEquity.pdf (finding that boards of pri-
vate equity portfolio companies are smaller and meet more frequently after 
take-private transactions). 
 8. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 132 (arguing that private 
equity firms use their industry and operating knowledge to implement value-
enhancing changes at their portfolio companies and hire outside experts when 
they do not have the expertise internally); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 
251–55 (noting that the high compensation offered by private equity firms al-
lows private equity to attract directors with greater financial and industry-spe-
cific expertise). When this Article refers to private equity’s corporate-govern-
ance structure, it is intended that the reader will understand the term to include 
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shared interests among sponsors, management, and ownership, 
thereby incentivizing optimal corporate decision-making and the 
maximization of overall equityholder wealth.  
This conventional wisdom about the benefits of the private 
equity corporate-governance model, however, overlooks the 
many ways in which private equity in fact exacerbates conflicts 
of interest between management and ownership. First, the com-
pensation structure for private equity sponsors (that is, the pri-
vate equity firm itself) creates a classic situation of moral haz-
ard: sponsors capture much of the gain from any profits on their 
investments, but are largely insulated from any losses.9 The re-
sult is that private equity sponsors have financial incentives to 
take excessive risk in their investment strategies. Second, lim-
ited-partner investors in private equity funds invest in these 
funds under significantly less advantageous terms than typical 
investors in public companies.10 They have limited governance 
 
the entire nexus of contracts that determine the way in which the private equity 
firm and its related entities are governed. Thus, while some scholars have fo-
cused exclusively on the way that portfolio companies are run, and others have 
focused exclusively on the way that private equity funds are run, this Article 
intends to address the entirety of the private equity governance structure, from 
investors to firms to funds to portfolio companies, in order to tease out the in-
centives and potential misalignments between these entities. For a full look at 
the distinctions, see infra Part I.A below. 
 9. Moral hazard is most often described in the insurance context: when 
individuals have purchased insurance (say, theft insurance) and know that they 
will not bear the cost of any losses related to the insurance, they will be more 
likely to take risks, or at least not to take steps to prevent the risks from mate-
rializing. See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 
541, 541 (1979) (“Moral hazard refers here to the tendency of insurance protec-
tion to alter an individual’s motive to prevent loss.”). But the general phenome-
non of moral hazard, that is, situations in which parties are incentivized to take 
excessive risk because of their protection from losses, is seen in a wide range of 
fields and industries. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulat-
ing Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 255–57 (2010) (banking industry); Ronald 
J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisi-
tions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 357–58 (2005) (merger agreements); Albert C. 
Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 701–
07 (2013) (geoengineering and climate change); Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense 
of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 190–96 (2011) (executive 
compensation). 
 10. The limited governance rights granted to investors in private equity 
funds is all the more surprising given the aforementioned moral hazard problem 
in private equity’s compensation structure. After all, one of the two traditional 
responses to moral hazard is better observation of the risk-taker ’s actions (the 
other being incomplete coverage of losses). See Shavell, supra note 9 (“Incom-
plete coverage gives an individual a motive to prevent loss by exposing him to 
some financial risk; and observation of care also gives an individual a motive to 
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rights, they have little access to information, and they have few 
avenues for transferring or selling their equity interests in the 
fund.11 Finally, private equity funds treat investors differen-
tially, often giving better terms to favored investors.12 So, for ex-
ample, an individual investor may enter into a side letter with a 
private equity fund ensuring that the preferred investor pays 
lower fees than other, less-favored investors. Or a private equity 
fund may grant one investor a greater right to access infor-
mation about company performance, or even a right to veto cer-
tain investments. 
In sum, the private equity governance model creates a num-
ber of corporate-governance costs, these costs are endemic to the 
private equity industry, and they are largely unrecognized as a 
potential source of conflict between private equity firms and 
their investors. This state of affairs presents a puzzle for tradi-
tional contract theories, under which agreements willingly en-
tered into by arms-length parties should be expected to maxim-
ize joint wealth.13 In other words, if private equity’s governance 
terms create such substantial harms for investors, why would 
investors willingly agree to them, rather than negotiate for bet-
ter terms or simply walk away? 
This Article argues that the persistence of private equity’s 
governance costs can be explained as a result of three related 
phenomena. First, private equity’s structure benefits from 
strong path-dependency effects that lock in the current structure 
even in the face of changes in external markets. Second, private 
equity investors face collective-action problems on multiple axes 
 
prevent loss, as it allows the insurer to link to the perceived level of care either 
the insurance premium or the amount of coverage paid in the event of a claim.”). 
 11. See infra Part I.B. 
 12. William Clayton, Preferential Treatment and the Rise of Individualized 
Investing in Private Equity, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 249, 270–79 (describing the 
varieties of preferential treatment granted to investors in private equity). 
 13. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Con-
tract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“The corporation is a complex set 
of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to 
select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and oppor-
tunities that are available in a large economy.”); Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd 
Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 347 (1996) (“In the ab-
sence of information imperfections, corporate contracts are expected to maxim-
ize the joint wealth of the contracting parties.”); Eric A. Posner, Economic Anal-
ysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE 
L.J. 829, 832–34 (2003) (summarizing the basic conditions and limitations on 
efficient contract theory). 
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that inhibit cooperation between investors and encourage oppor-
tunistic behavior by private equity firms. Third, and finally, the 
reputational constraints on private equity firm behavior have 
been systematically overestimated as a tool for aligning the in-
terests of firms and investors. 
But these corporate-governance flaws in the private equity 
model are not inevitable or, for that matter, unchangeable. A 
number of potential solutions present themselves. One approach 
is increased regulation of the private equity industry in order to 
strengthen and better align the interests of private equity firms 
and their investors. Another approach is increased cooperation 
among institutional investors outside of the transactional con-
text in order to reset governance and compliance norms and 
overcome path-dependency problems. Yet another approach is a 
greater role for independent information intermediaries, such as 
ratings agencies or third-party consultants, who can step in to 
help improve the quantity and quality of information provided 
about private equity funds. It may well be that all of these ap-
proaches together are necessary in order to fully resolve the 
structural problems inherent in the private equity corporate-
governance structure. 
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I provides a basic 
background on the structure of private equity and survey the lit-
erature on private equity’s so-called governance dividend. Part 
II sets forth private equity’s corporate-governance costs and ex-
plains the ways in which current structures create perverse in-
centives for risk-taking and opportunistic behavior by private 
equity firms. Part III explains why these governance costs per-
sist despite strong reasons for abandoning them. Part IV con-
cludes by sketching out a set of potential reforms for reducing 
private equity’s governance costs.  
I.  PRIVATE EQUITY’S GOVERNANCE DIVIDEND?   
The private equity industry has seen dramatic growth over 
the past decade. The number of active private equity firms has 
increased by 143% since 2000.14 The amount of capital raised by 
private equity firms has grown from $93 billion in 2003 to $527 
billion in 2015.15 Buyout funds are by now ubiquitous, and pri-
vate equity acquisitions have become a mainstay on the front 
 
 14. Number of Active PE Firms Up, supra note 4. 
 15. BAIN & CO., supra note 4, at 2. 
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page of the Wall Street Journal.16 The compensation of private 
equity managers has grown commensurately—Steve A. 
Schwarzman of the Blackstone Group is estimated to have 
earned $800 million in 2015, while Leon Black of Apollo Global 
Management received $200 million.17  
The tremendous growth in the private equity industry has 
sparked a lively debate about the root causes of private equity’s 
success. While critics have focused on its favorable tax treat-
ment,18 its shedding of costly pension plans,19 and its heavy lob-
bying of state governments,20 an increasing number of scholars 
have argued that private equity’s primary appeal, and its great-
est advantage, lies in its unique governance structure.21 
Through a careful admixture of industry expertise, large equity 
stakes, and performance-based compensation packages, private 
equity firms have crafted a superior governance model that has 
brought superior returns to its investors over long periods of 
time.22 In other words, private equity’s growth is largely at-
tributable to a governance dividend. 
The evidence in support of the governance-dividend theory, 
however, is decidedly mixed. While there is some evidence that 
private equity firms institute changes that improve operational 
metrics in their companies, it is unclear that these improve-
ments lead to superior returns for investors. And in recent years, 
performance has decreased, with private equity investments 
 
 16. E.g., Ryan Dezember, Blackstone Gains from Big Banks’ Pain, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 22, 2016, at A1; Ryan Dezember, Oil Bets Doom Texas Private-Equity 
Fund, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2017, at A1; Matt Jarzemsky & Marie Beaudette, 
The $8 Billion Buyout That Went from Bad to Worse, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2016, 
at A1. 
 17. Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, Just How Much Do the Top Private 
Equity Earners Make?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/business/dealbook/just-how-much-do-the-top-private 
-equity-earners-make.html. 
 18. Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/29/business/yourmoney/ 
29view.html. 
 19. Elizabeth Lewis, A Bad Man’s Guide to Private Equity and Pensions 4–
5 (Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics, Working Paper No. 68, 2015), http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2620320. 
 20. Ben Protess et al., How Private Equity Found Power and Profit in State 
Capitols, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/07/15/business/dealbook/private-equity-influence-fortress-investment 
-group.html. 
 21. See infra Part I.B. 
 22. Id. 
 1854 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1847 
 
failing to outperform their benchmarks in several studies.23 This 
evidence raises questions about the accuracy of governance-div-
idend theories. 
This Part proceeds in three Sections. First, Section A out-
lines the governance structure of private equity, highlighting in 
particular the compensation structure for private equity firms. 
Second, Section B discusses the potential benefits of private eq-
uity’s governance structure, with a focus on incentives, exper-
tise, and monitoring. Finally, Section C presents the weak em-
pirical evidence in support of the governance-dividend theory of 
private equity. 
A. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS 
In order to understand private equity’s so-called governance 
dividend, it may be useful to begin with a brief primer on the 
typical structure of private equity investments.24 This Article fo-
cuses on private equity buyout funds, which may be distin-
guished from other sorts of business models that may also be 
termed private equity, such as venture capital firms or angel in-
vestors, or other sorts of investment strategies that private eq-
uity firms engage in, such as distressed debt investments or sec-
ondary investments.25 
Private equity firms are typically made up of small groups 
of investment professionals, often with backgrounds in large in-
vestment banks such as Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan, who 
 
 23. See infra Part I.C. 
 24. It should be noted at the outset that any outline of the typical private 
equity structure will by necessity not cover all the varieties of structures that 
private equity firms utilize. As any private equity lawyer knows, every deal is 
different, and so is every fund. However, this Section will attempt to provide a 
broad overview of the key participants, governing documents, and legal entities 
that are common to many private equity investments. For additional detail on 
the structure of private equity transactions, see EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSE-
MARY BATT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH (CEPR), A PRIMER ON PRI-
VATE EQUITY AT WORK 9–20 (2012), http://www.cepr.net/documents/ 
publications/private-equity-2012-02.pdf; Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 
124–25. 
 25. For a discussion of distressed debt and secondary investments by pri-
vate equity firms and, more generally, the proliferation of private equity strat-
egies, see William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? 
Investment Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (2009). 
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specialize in the acquisition, management, and sale of compa-
nies.26 They tend to have few employees, low overhead, and min-
imal expenses.27 While a few of the largest private equity firms 
have gone public, listing their shares on domestic stock ex-
changes,28 most private equity firms are small private compa-
nies organized as partnerships or limited liability companies.29 
Most private equity transactions follow a now well-estab-
lished playbook. First, the private equity firm raises money from 
a set of investors, typically large institutions such as university 
endowments, pension plans, and sovereign wealth funds.30 Sec-
ond, these investments are pooled into an investment vehicle 
(the “private equity fund”).31 The fund is generally organized as 
a limited partnership, with the private equity firm serving as the 
fund’s general partner and making day-to-day management de-
cisions, and the investors serving as passive limited partners.32 
Third, when the private equity firm identifies an appropriate 
target company, the fund acquires the target (or “portfolio com-
pany”) using a mixture of the pooled investments from the inves-
tors and a substantial amount of debt from lenders.33 As a result 
of the acquisition, the portfolio company becomes a highly-lever-
aged, wholly-owned subsidiary of the private equity fund.34 
While the portfolio company will often retain its executive offic-
ers, it will also enter into a management agreement with the pri-
vate equity firm, pursuant to which it will pay certain fees to the 
firm in return for management services.35 Finally, after a period 
of time, the fund will exit its investment, either by selling the 
 
 26. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 121 (distinguishing private 
equity firms from venture capital firms); Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 61 
(finding large institutions are the primary owners of private debt). 
 27. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 121. 
 28. E.g., Lloyd L. Drury, III, Publicly Held Private Equity Firms and the 
Rejection of Law as a Governance Device, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 57, 66–67 (2013) 
(discussing “Blackstone Group, one of the first private equity firms to sell shares 
to the public”); Gregory Zuckerman, For Private-Equity Clients, Worries Over 
Public Listing, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304231204576406052688509710 (listing Apollo Global 
Management LLC and KKR & Co., which has already gone public, as well as a 
slew of additional firms on the verge). 
 29. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123 (describing private equity 
firms). 
 30. Id. at 123–24 (describing private equity funds). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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company to another buyer or taking it public through an initial 
public offering.36 The private equity firm will be entitled to a cer-
tain percentage of the profits from the sale (the “carried inter-
est,” often equal to twenty percent of the profits), while the in-
vestors will be entitled to the remainder.37 Figure 1 below 
illustrates a simplified organizational chart of this structure. 
 
Figure 1: Private Equity Governance Structure 
 
 
 
A few key features of the private equity structure are im-
portant to note. First, while the acquired company is formally 
owned by the private equity fund, which owns all of the out-
standing equity in the company, the ultimate owners are the pri-
vate equity firm itself and its investors.38 The respective rights 
 
 36. This, at least, is the intended outcome. In fact, many investments are 
difficult to exit, as demonstrated by the increasing proliferation of so-called zom-
bie funds that are unwilling or unable to sell their underlying portfolio compa-
nies and that therefore continue in existence. See Zombies at the Gates: The 
Funds that Will Not Die, ECONOMIST (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.economist 
.com/news/finance-and-economics/21574043-funds-will-not-die-zombies-gates. 
 37. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 124. 
 38. The portfolio company typically has the private equity fund as its sole 
shareholder or member, but the private equity fund itself will have a general 
partner and a number of limited partners that, together, own all of the equity 
Private Equity Firm 
Investors 
(Endowments, Pension 
Plans, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds) 
Private Equity Fund 
Portfolio Company 
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and obligations of the private equity firm and the investors are 
set out in the fund’s limited partnership agreement, which will 
typically include provisions on voting rights, access to infor-
mation, and transfer restrictions.39 Second, the private equity 
firm receives compensation in two forms: first, through ongoing 
monitoring and management fees; and second, through a carried 
interest, which entitles the firm to share in a portion of the prof-
its from the sale of the portfolio company (the fabled “2 and 
20”).40 The compensation arrangements for private equity firms 
will be discussed in greater depth in Part II.A.  
Finally, the simplified model of the private equity structure 
presented in Figure 1 leaves out two important complicating fac-
tors. Most private equity firms create more than one fund, and 
each fund typically acquires more than one portfolio company.41 
This strategy allows the firm to deploy more capital, from a more 
diversified investor group, and across a broader array of indus-
tries.42 However, as one can imagine, the organizational charts 
for such entities quickly become unwieldy, with intricate owner-
ship tracks and overlapping interests, and can be a potential 
source of misaligned interests, as will be discussed in Part III.B. 
Now that we have a basic understanding of the private eq-
uity governance model, we can turn to the arguments about pri-
vate equity’s governance dividend. 
B. STANDARD VIEWS OF PRIVATE EQUITY’S GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE 
It is a widespread belief that private equity’s primary ap-
peal, and its greatest advantage, lies in its unique governance 
 
interests in the fund. Therefore, the ultimate owners of the portfolio company 
are the private equity firm and its investors. Of course, the private equity firm 
and the limited partners typically are not natural persons, and thus the owner-
ship chain could be traced even further, but for the purposes of this Article, 
discussion will be limited to the firm and its investors.  
 39. Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 
275 (2010) (discussing the contract design of limited partnership agreements). 
 40. For a detailed analysis of the breakdown of fees and carried interest 
received by private equity firms, see David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Do 
Private Equity Fund Managers Earn Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership, 
and Cash Flow Performance, 26 REV. FINANC. STUD. 2760, 2761–62 (2013). 
 41. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 115, 121–24 (2013) (“A private equity firm manages one or 
more private equity funds at once, and each such fund typically holds several 
companies at once.”). 
 42. For a discussion about the problems associated with this approach, see 
infra Part III.B. 
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structure.43 According to this view, private equity provides a par-
ticularly beneficial form of corporate governance for companies, 
one that compares favorably to other corporate forms. Through 
concentrated ownership stakes, active monitoring, and high lev-
erage, private equity firms make use of a number of tools and 
incentives to reduce the traditional agency costs between man-
agement and ownership.44 The resulting governance dividend al-
lows private equity firms to improve company performance and 
realize benefits for investors and firms alike.  
While proponents of the governance-dividend theory de-
scribe the problem from a number of different perspectives, un-
derlying all of these perspectives is a basic dilemma in corporate 
law—the ownership-management divide.45 The concept is sim-
ple: the managers of a company have different, and oftentimes 
conflicting, incentives from those of owners. The owners, who by 
definition own the equity interests in the company, have an in-
terest in maximizing the overall equity value of the company,46 
while the managers have an interest in doing a variety of other 
 
 43. See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 5; Davis, supra note 5, at 85–88 (explain-
ing a better governance is created when there is more contact between equity 
owners and management); Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 5, 328–29 (“This 
process results in a complete rethinking of the organization’s strategy and its 
structure.”); Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 62 (arguing that private equity 
resolves the struggle between owners and managers); Kaplan & Strömberg, su-
pra note 5, at 130–32 (describing three changes private equity firms make to 
investments after purchase); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, 241–51 (listing 
benefits associated with this form of governance); Heel & Kehoe, supra note 5 
(explaining changes of governance used to create value in private equity firms’ 
portfolio companies); see also, e.g., Cornelli & Karakas, supra note 7 (exploring 
positive effects of smaller, more active boards of directors in private equity). 
 44. See Michael C. Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity (and 
Some Concerns) 3 (Nov. 27, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=963530 (arguing 
that the structure of private equity “enables the capture of value destroyed by 
agency problems in public firms—especially failures in governance”). 
 45. It should be noted at the outset that there is some confusion as to who 
precisely should be considered the management of portfolio companies. In one 
sense, it is the executives at the portfolio-company level, who, after all, are re-
sponsible for most day-to-day decisions at the company. But, it is also the pri-
vate equity firm itself, which typically is paid a management fee and is actively 
involved in portfolio company’s decisions. Thus private equity is a kind of hybrid 
where the management-ownership divide is more fluid and ambiguous than one 
would typically find at a large public corporation. For the classic description of 
this dilemma, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220–32 (1933).  
 46. Of course, the owners among themselves may also have differing inter-
ests. See Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Sharehold-
ers, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1557–66 (2015) (arguing that both short-term share-
holders and long-term shareholders may, in certain circumstances, benefit from 
value-destroying behavior by managers).  
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things that may destroy that value—for example, maximizing 
their compensation, entrenching themselves in their positions, 
or building empires.47 These agency costs can be pronounced, 
particularly in a world of public companies owned by dispersed 
shareholders facing severe collective-action problems.48 
How, then, does private equity resolve this dilemma? Ac-
cording to proponents of the governance-dividend theory, private 
equity reduces agency costs through three mechanisms: (1) bet-
ter incentives; (2) better monitoring; and (3) better expertise.49  
First, private equity firms strongly incentivize management 
to run their portfolio companies in ways that maximize equi-
tyholder wealth. They do so by: (1) compensating managers at 
the portfolio companies with large equity stakes in their compa-
nies, so that managers will have a strong financial incentive to 
improve the company’s performance;50 (2) leveraging companies 
with large amounts of debt, so that managers will have little ex-
cess cash flow available for inefficient or wasteful projects;51 and 
(3) quickly and frequently replacing officers that underperform, 
thereby reducing the ability of managers to entrench themselves 
and keeping constant pressure on managers to pursue value-
maximizing business strategies.52 These governance mecha-
nisms reduce agency costs within private equity companies by 
 
 47. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Man-
agerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
308–09 (1976) (proposing a theory of firm ownership to explain managerial 
choices that end up lowering overall firm value). 
 48. Marco Becht et al., Corporate Law and Governance, in HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 829, 833–34 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 
2007). 
 49. The use of the comparative here raises an obvious question: Better than 
what? The short answer is publicly listed corporations. Most commentators 
have compared private equity’s governance structure with that of the typical 
publicly-listed corporation. See, e.g., Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 219 
(“We claim that one major reason for this success is due to the corporate gov-
ernance advantages of private equity over those of the public corporation.”). Of 
course, private equity firms are not limited to buying public companies, and 
they often do buy other forms of company, including privately held partnerships, 
corporations, and limited liability companies.  
 50. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 244–46. 
 51. Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 5, at 324. The large amount of debt 
also magnifies the compensation incentives faced by managers: managers will 
be able to capture a greater percentage of the gains from improved firm perfor-
mance. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 228.  
 52. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 131 (“Leverage creates pressure 
on managers not to waste money, because they must make interest and princi-
pal payments.”). 
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aligning the interests of managers and owners and minimizing 
incentives for shirking. 
Second, private equity firms do a particularly good job of 
monitoring management, both directly and indirectly. By con-
centrating ownership into a single blockholder (the private eq-
uity fund), private equity overcomes the typical free rider prob-
lems that bedevil public corporations with dispersed 
shareholders.53 The private equity fund, unlike a small investor 
in a public company, has both the financial interest and the in-
dustry expertise to closely monitor the behavior of managers, 
and is a particularly active monitor at that.54 In addition, the 
large amount of debt placed on portfolio companies serves as a 
kind of indirect monitor, disciplining managers to focus on cash 
flow and firm value.55 A further side effect of debt financing is 
that it brings another monitor into the game, namely, debthold-
ers.56 The debtholders of portfolio companies are typically large, 
sophisticated financial institutions, and, given the extreme lev-
erage of most private equity transactions, have strong incentives 
to monitor risky behavior by managers.57 This combination of 
strong direct and indirect monitoring of management behavior 
reduces information asymmetries and prevents value-destroying 
actions by managers. 
Finally, some commentators argue that private equity’s gov-
ernance dividend stems from its smarter use of expertise.58 In 
this view, the private equity model benefits from, and indeed is 
centered around, the gathering and deployment of expertise—
financial, operational, and industrial. Private equity firms spe-
cialize in particular sectors (such as technology, health care, or 
consumer products), and they utilize their substantial experi-
 
 53. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 228–29. 
 54. See Cornelli & Karakas, supra note 7 (finding that the boards of private 
equity companies are smaller and meet more frequently). 
 55. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 131 (describing leverage as a 
key ingredient to private equity governance). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 247. 
 58. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 132 (“Private equity firms 
use their industry and operating knowledge to identify attractive investments, 
to develop value creation plans for those investments, and to implement the 
value creation plans.”); Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 223 (“The general 
partners act as advisors to the portfolio company’s management and as mem-
bers of the company’s board of directors, and draw on their expertise in corpo-
rate restructurings and their contacts throughout the industry to assist in cre-
ating value.”). 
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ence from other transactions to maximize the value of their port-
folio companies.59 They supplement this expertise by hiring pro-
fessionals with operational backgrounds in the industry and re-
taining outside consulting groups.60 Since private equity firms 
control the boards of their portfolio companies, they can easily 
add directors to fill specific gaps in expertise, and they can com-
pensate these board members highly.61 Experts are often more 
willing to serve on the boards of private equity companies than 
on the boards of public companies because of the smaller risk of 
litigation and the lighter regulatory burdens.62 
In sum, an increasing number of scholars have argued that 
private equity has a corporate-governance advantage over other 
forms of business organization, and in particular over the public 
company. They identify this advantage as primarily a question 
of reducing agency costs between management and ownership. 
Through concentrated ownership stakes, high leverage, and fi-
nancial and operational expertise, private equity has discovered 
a particularly potent form of interest alignment, one that both 
overcomes the collective-action problems inherent in dispersed-
ownership models and incentivizes the key parties to pursue 
value-maximizing business strategies.  
C. EVIDENCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY’S GOVERNANCE DIVIDEND 
Does private equity’s governance model create value? This 
is a difficult question to answer empirically, as it requires relia-
ble and representative data on private equity performance and 
a reasonable set of comparable benchmarks from other compa-
nies. Because private equity companies are not subject to com-
prehensive public-company disclosure regulations, information 
about their performance is difficult to come by, and firms have 
 
 59. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 126–28. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 254 (“Another important ele-
ment of effective board monitoring is the extent to which board members are 
given greater access to proprietary information in these private-equity firms, 
which can include more frequent and specialized financial reports.”). 
 62. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 1055, 1059 (2006) (“Too much fear of liability, therefore, may reduce ra-
ther than enhance the quality of board decisions.”); Davis, supra note 5, at 84–
85 (listing advantages of going private); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside 
Directors As a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 898, 912–17 (1996) (explaining the managerial-hegemony theory 
behind boards of directors). 
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incentives to disclose favorable information while concealing un-
favorable information, thus skewing the data.63 However, in re-
cent years, a number of scholars have attempted to overcome 
these issues and test private equity’s performance against 
benchmark companies, relying on information from industry 
sources, voluntary self-reporting from private equity firms and 
investors, and commercial data-collection companies.64  
First, from an operational standpoint, several studies have 
indicated that private equity’s portfolio companies tend to im-
prove across a number of performance metrics post-buyout. They 
demonstrate improved productivity,65 better profit margins,66 
greater return on sales,67 and higher earnings-to-sales ratios.68 
On the other hand, some scholars have expressed doubt about 
whether these results are in fact caused by any changes that pri-
vate equity firms enact, suggesting instead that private equity 
firms tend to target companies that have underperformed in re-
cent years and thus benefit from a reversion to the mean.69 When 
compared to similarly underperforming firms that did not expe-
rience buyouts, private equity portfolio companies experience 
smaller, or indeed no, operational improvements.70 Thus it is un-
clear to what extent private equity firms improve the operational 
performance of their portfolio companies, although the weight of 
the studies appear to conclude that the effect is generally posi-
tive. 
 
 63. See Robert S. Harris et al., Private Equity Performance: What Do We 
Know?, 69 J. FIN. 1851, 1851 (2014) (stating that uncertainty about private eq-
uity performance is driven by “uneven disclosure of [private equity] returns and 
questions about the quality of data available for research”). 
 64. Id. at 1855–56. 
 65. Davis et al., supra note 2, at 3959. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Jonathan B. Cohn & Erin M. Towery, The Determinants and Conse-
quences of Private Equity Buyouts of Private Firms: Evidence from U.S. Corpo-
rate Tax Returns 2 (Working Paper, 2013), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ 
372c/0d57744ed92af63622074d86407773c2faa6.pdf. 
 68. Shourun Guo et al., Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?, 66 J. FIN. 479, 481 
(2011). 
 69. See Jonathan B. Cohn et al., The Evolution of Capital Structure and 
Operating Performance after Leveraged Buyouts: Evidence from U.S. Corporate 
Tax Returns, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 470 (2014) (concluding “our operating per-
formance results appear inconsistent with the view that [leveraged buyouts] 
lead to improvements in operating performance, either through the disciplining 
effects of leverage and concentrated ownership, or through operational exper-
tise supplied by private equity acquirers” (citations omitted)). 
 70. Id. 
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Operational improvements, however, do not necessarily lead 
to improved returns for investors, and another set of studies 
have focused on this question, with similarly mixed results. A 
number of studies in the 2000s and early 2010s concluded that 
private equity outperformed its benchmarks and created eco-
nomic value for investors.71 These studies focused on what a lim-
ited-partner investor in a private equity fund would have 
earned, net of fees, compared to a public market equivalent, 
which is what the investor would have earned if it had invested 
the same amount of money in the market (typically measured by 
an index based on the S&P 500).72 Most of these studies were 
largely positive about private equity’s performance, finding ex-
cess returns to investors of between three and eight percent per 
year over public market equivalents.73 
In recent years, however, studies have shown significantly 
smaller returns for private equity funds.74 One study from 2015 
concluded that the median return for liquidated private equity 
funds was nine percent higher than S&P 500 public market 
equivalents over the life of the fund, which, assuming a fund life 
of ten years, equates to an average annual outperformance of 
only 0.87%.75 When assessed against comparable companies that 
 
 71. See Harris et al., supra note 63, at 1852 (finding that “average U.S. 
buyout fund returns have exceeded those of public markets for most vintages 
since 1984”); Chris Higson & Rüdiger Stucke, The Performance of Private Equity 
2 (Working Paper, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009067 (finding that U.S. 
private equity funds with vintage years from 1980 to 2008 outperformed the 
S&P 500 by over five hundred basis points per annum as of June 2010); David 
T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Private Equity in the 21st Century: Liquidity, 
Cash Flows, and Performance from 1984–2010, at 2 (Working Paper, 2011), 
http://efa2011.efa-online.org/fisher.osu.edu/blogs/efa2011/files/FIE_2_1.pdf 
(finding that private equity buyout funds outperformed the S&P 500 on a net-
of-fee basis in every vintage year since 1992). 
 72. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 63. 
 73. See id. at 1863 (finding median excess returns of 3.4% over the S&P 
500); Alexander Ljungqvist & Matthew P. Richardson, The Cash Flow, Return, 
and Risk Characteristics of Private Equity 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 03-001, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=369600 (finding av-
erage excess returns of 8.06% and median excess returns of 6.04% over the S&P 
500). 
 74. E.g. Ludovic Phalippou, Performance of Buyout Funds Revisited?, 
18 REV. FIN. 189, 215–16 (2014) (finding that the average buyout fund under-
performs by 3.1% when benchmarked to a leveraged small-value index). 
 75. EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RE-
SEARCH, ARE LOWER PRIVATE EQUITY RETURNS THE NEW NORMAL? 16 (2016), 
http://cepr.net/publications/reports/are-lower-private-equity-returns-the-new 
-normal; David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Cyclicality, Performance Meas-
urement, and Cash Flow Liquidity in Private Equity, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 521, 526 
(2016). 
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more closely matched the characteristics of the funds, even this 
minimal outperformance disappeared: the median return for liq-
uidated private equity funds exactly matched that of targeted 
public market equivalents.76 Another 2015 study, using infor-
mation provided by institutional investors in private equity 
funds, concluded that, while private equity fund returns ex-
ceeded those from public markets in earlier years, since 2006 
their performance was roughly equal to that of public markets.77 
Finally, yet another study, focusing on risk-adjusted perfor-
mance of private equity funds, reached a largely similar result, 
concluding that “[a]fter adjusting for appropriate risks, we found 
no outperformance of buyout funds vis-à-vis their public market 
equivalents on a dollar-weighted basis.”78 
Thus there appears to be some evidence that private equity 
firms institute changes that improve revenue metrics and prof-
itability in their companies. For many years, this appeared to 
translate into superior returns for investors, as compared with 
similar investments in broad public market indexes. However, 
in recent years, evidence has mounted that private equity fails 
to outperform its basic benchmarks of comparison. This result 
calls into question the assertion that private equity’s governance 
model is superior to that of the typical public corporation, sug-
gesting that the corporate-governance dividend may well be 
overstated. The following Section will examine these questions 
by looking closer at the governance structure of private equity 
investments in order to identify potentially unexamined govern-
ance costs. 
II.  GOVERNANCE COSTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY   
Private equity presents a unique model of corporate govern-
ance. Structured neither as a large, publicly held corporation nor 
a small, closely held company, private equity is instead some-
thing of a hybrid, drawing bits and pieces from both models in 
order to create a sui generis entity. As described above, many 
scholars have argued that private equity’s governance structure 
is superior to other forms of corporate governance.79 In this view, 
 
 76. Robinson & Sensoy, supra note 75.  
 77. See Robert S. Harris et al., How Do Private Equity Investments Perform 
Compared to Public Equity?, 14 J. INV. MGMT. 14, 15 (2016). 
 78. Jean-François L’Her et al., A Bottom-Up Approach to the Risk-Adjusted 
Performance of the Buyout Fund Market, 72 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 36, 46 (2016).  
 79. See supra Part I.B. 
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the private equity governance model resolves the most perni-
cious forms of misalignment between owners and management 
and leads to better company performance and investor returns.80 
It may then come as a surprise that recent studies have shown 
that private equity’s returns over the last decade have not ex-
ceeded those that would have been earned in a low-cost index 
fund, particularly given the additional risks and lower liquidity 
that are associated with private equity funds.81 
This Section will argue that the conventional view of private 
equity’s governance dividend is flawed. Private equity’s govern-
ance structure, far from eliminating conflicts of interest and 
moral hazard, exacerbates them. It does so in three ways. First, 
private equity firms are compensated in ways that incentivize 
them to engage in opportunistic and risky behavior to the detri-
ment of investors. Second, private equity firms grant severely 
restricted governance rights to limited-partner investors in their 
funds. Third, private equity firms do not grant equal and non-
discriminatory treatment to all investors in the same fund, in-
stead parceling out differential and advantageous treatment to 
select favored investors. Put together, these governance mecha-
nisms create a series of situations in which the interests of pri-
vate equity firms diverge from those of their investors.82  
This Section will examine each of the three types of govern-
ance costs associated with private equity and provide a descrip-
tion of how prevalent these costs are in the industry. It will 
sketch out some preliminary arguments about these categories 
and discuss the factors that may heighten, or mitigate, their 
costs in particular funds. It will argue that, in some cases, pri-
vate equity’s governance structure causes individually rational 
institutional actors to act in suboptimal ways over persistent pe-
riods of time. 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See supra Part I.C. 
 82. To be clear, it is impossible to entirely eliminate agency costs in any 
plausible scenario involving owners and managers of a company. Principals nat-
urally have different interests than agents, and unless the principals exert com-
plete control over all agent decision-making, misalignments will inevitably 
arise. This Section, however, will attempt to highlight the primary areas of mis-
alignment within the private equity corporate governance structure, assess the 
severity of the misalignment, and describe the potentially harmful effects de-
riving from it. 
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A. THE MORAL HAZARD OF PRIVATE EQUITY COMPENSATION 
Many scholars have argued that one of private equity’s pri-
mary governance benefits is that it better aligns the compensa-
tion incentives of managers with the interests of owners.83 Be-
cause the executive officers of portfolio companies invest more of 
their money in their companies and are compensated with larger 
equity stakes as compared with their counterparts at public com-
panies, the argument goes, they have stronger incentives to pur-
sue business strategies that contribute to long-term growth.84  
However, this focus on the incentives of management at the 
portfolio company level overlooks the incentives of management 
at the fund level. It is important to keep in mind that the private 
equity governance structure has three levels of ownership: 
(1) the portfolio company at the bottom; (2) the fund in the mid-
dle; and (3) the private equity firm and passive institutional in-
vestors at the top.85 While it is true that there are managers at 
the portfolio company level, there are also managers at the fund 
level. Each has separate incentives. Thus, a focus solely on the 
incentives of executive teams at the portfolio company level, 
without an understanding of the incentives of private equity 
firms themselves, overlooks the fundamental role that private 
equity firms play in company decision-making. 
A closer look at the incentives of private equity firms reveals 
a number of striking ways in which agency costs reinsert them-
selves into the process. Private equity firms are generally com-
pensated in two ways. First, they receive annual management 
fees, which entitle the firm to a percentage (often two percent) of 
the capital that is committed by investors and/or the capital that 
is employed by the fund.86 Second, they receive a carried interest 
in the fund, which entitles the firm to a specified percentage 
(typically twenty percent, although this number can vary) of any 
 
 83. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 130–31; Kaplan, supra note 
6, at 242; Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 251–52. 
 84. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 5, at 251–52. 
 85. See supra Part I.A. 
 86. Management fees are often structured so that, at the beginning of the 
fund, the fee is based on the total amount of capital that investors have commit-
ted to invest, and, once the investment period has ended, the fee is based on the 
actual invested capital. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123–24. Private 
equity firms may also receive a variety of other fees, including transaction fees 
and monitoring fees, which can vary widely in their application and size, but a 
full analysis and typology of these fees is beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
fuller discussion of the various fees charged by private equity firms and their 
contribution to firm profit, see Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Econom-
ics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2319–20 (2010). 
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profits of the fund.87 Each of these prongs—the management fee 
and the carried interest—has agency costs embedded in its struc-
ture. 
1. Management Fees 
Even a cursory glance at the structure of management fees 
charged by private equity firms reveals the agency costs inher-
ent in the mechanism. A significant portion of private equity 
firm compensation comes from management fees that are not 
tied directly to the performance of the underlying companies.88 
A recent study found that approximately two-thirds of a private 
equity firm’s expected revenue from investments comes from 
fixed-revenue components,89 primarily management fees. Thus, 
private equity firms earn a large proportion of their compensa-
tion regardless of how their investments turn out.  
More importantly, the structure of management fees creates 
a set of skewed incentives for private equity firms. Because man-
agement fees are based on total capital committed and total cap-
ital actually invested, private equity firms have strong incen-
tives to (1) raise as much capital as possible, regardless of the 
reasonable prospects for putting it to use,90 and (2) invest as 
much capital as possible, regardless of the expected performance 
of the target companies.91 Both of these incentives create risks 
for investors—in the form of money committed but unable to be 
 
 87. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 124; David A. Weisbach, The Tax-
ation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715, 716 (2008). 
 88. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 86, at 2305. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See KLAAS P. BAKS & LAWRENCE M. BENVENISTE, EMORY CTR. ALT. 
INVS., ALIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 7 (2010), 
http://goizueta.emory.edu/faculty/cai/documents/ECAI_Alignment.pdf; Martin 
Steindl, The Alignment of Interests Between the General and the Limited Partner 
in a Private Equity Fund—The Ultimate Governance Nut to Crack?, CORP. GOV-
ERNANCE DEV. FRAMEWORK (Feb. 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Alignment-of-Interests-between-the-General 
-and-the-Limited-Partner-in-a-Private-Equity-Fund__Full-Article-1.pdf. 
 91. See Dawei Fang, Dry Powder and Short Fuses: Private Equity Funds in 
Emerging Markets 1 (Working Paper, 2015), http://www.gu.se/digitalAssets/ 
1539/1539613_fang-dry_powder_short_fuses.pdf (quoting a private equity man-
ager as saying that, in the face of an impending investment period deadline, one 
should “[j]ust spend the money in time and do not worry much about making 
bad deals”); Becky Pritchard, Powder Stays Dry as Private Equity Struggles To 
Spend, WALL ST. J.: PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (July 21, 2015), https://blogs.wsj 
.com/privateequity/2015/07/21/powder-stays-dry-as-private-equity-struggles 
-to-spend (stating that “[i]f a private equity fund is not spending its money 
quickly enough, it may have to return money to investors or delay fundraising 
a new fund and that potentially means less money in management fees”). 
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used or investments made but unable to be exited—and these 
risks are not borne by the firm itself. While this risk may be mit-
igated by the fact that private equity firms benefit from in-
creases in the value of their portfolio companies, and thus do not 
have incentives to actively seek to destroy value, the majority of 
the risk is borne by the other investors, while private equity 
firms reap the gains from boosted management fees. 
To illustrate this point, consider a private equity firm, which 
we will call Empire Capital, that is nearing the end of its invest-
ment period. Let us assume that Empire Capital has raised a 
fund of $1 billion, and its compensation arrangement is the typ-
ical combination of a twenty percent carried interest and a two 
percent management fee. During the investment period, this 
management fee will be calculated as a percentage of total com-
mitted capital (i.e., $1 billion), but after the investment period, 
the base rate will change (or step down) to a percentage of capital 
actually invested. For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that the 
firm has not invested any of its capital yet and is down to a single 
potential target company, Lemon Corp., which is currently on 
the market for $1 billion.92 The firm believes that Lemon Corp. 
is a risky investment; there is a fifty percent chance that, at the 
time of exit, the target will decline in value to $500 million, a 
twenty-five percent chance that it will remain at $1 billion, and 
a twenty-five percent chance that it will increase in value to $1.5 
billion.93 We will assume that the time between investment and 
exit will be five years.94 
 
 92. In reality, most private equity firms will consider many different poten-
tial targets, not just one, and analyze their respective strengths and weaknesses 
before making an investment decision. All else equal, the firm should prefer 
targets with greater profit potential. However, the presence of multiple poten-
tial targets can at best reduce the magnitude of the moral hazard problem, not 
eliminate it. In addition, in the current environment where private equity firms 
are sitting on substantial dry powder that must be invested, it is not unreason-
able to assume that the universe of acceptable targets, compared to the availa-
ble capital ready for investment, has shrunk. Indeed, many observers have come 
to precisely this conclusion. See Private Equity: The Barbarian Establishment, 
supra note 1.  
 93. These values are net of all taxes, fees and expenses. 
 94. Of course, for most private equity investments, the firm does not know 
precisely when the exit will come—the decision depends on market conditions, 
industry developments, and company-specific risks. A 2015 study found that the 
average amount of time between an investment and an exit in the private equity 
industry was 5.5 years. See Amy Or, Average Private Equity Hold Times Drop 
to 5.5 Years, WALL ST. J.: PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (June 10, 2015), https://blogs 
.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/06/10/average-private-equity-hold-times-drop-to 
-5-5-years. Therefore, for this example, we will assume that the exit will take 
place in five years. 
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The expected value of the Lemon Corp. investment is $875 
million,95 and thus a rational investor would not be willing to 
pay $1 billion for it. But Empire Capital, importantly, does not 
internalize the full costs and benefits of its investments. Instead, 
it is paid based on two metrics: capital invested and profits. If it 
does not invest in Lemon Corp., it will be obligated to return the 
capital commitments and thus will earn neither management 
fees nor any potential carry, an expected value of $0. If it does 
invest in Lemon Corp., it will earn management fees for the five-
year life of the investment (two percent of $1 billion for five 
years, or $100 million) and also has a twenty-five percent chance 
of earning carried interest on profits (twenty percent of the dif-
ference between $1.5 and $1 billion, or $100 million). Thus the 
expected value of acquiring Lemon Corp. to Empire Capital is 
$125 million. Despite the fact that the overall expected value of 
the investment to all stakeholders is negative, acquiring Lemon 
Corp. is a rational economic decision from the perspective of Em-
pire Capital, given its compensation structure. If it does not ac-
quire Lemon Corp., it will earn nothing, while if it does acquire 
the company it can expect to earn $125 million. 
As this simple example demonstrates, the structure of man-
agement fees creates a classic situation of moral hazard.96 The 
private equity firm captures much of the gain from a risky in-
vestment (it is guaranteed to earn its management fee, which 
makes up the bulk of its expected earnings), and bears little, or 
even none, of any consequent losses if the risk happens to mate-
rialize. The result is that private equity firms have strong incen-
tives to take excessive risks in their investment decisions. This 
incentive is particularly strong when the private equity firm is 
nearing the end of its investment period and is sitting on dry 
powder—capital that has been committed by investors but that 
has not been invested—that it must either invest immediately 
or return to investors. Indeed, in this example, even if Lemon 
Corp. had zero chance of increasing in value, it would still be in 
Empire Capital’s economic interest to acquire the company, 
solely through its return on management fees. 
To be sure, this example is simplified and does not take into 
account the many variations in compensation that are found in 
limited partnership agreements and side letters with investors. 
 
 95. Calculated as fifty percent of $500 million plus twenty-five percent of 
$1 billion plus twenty-five percent of $1.5 billion. 
 96. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 334–37 (discussing the incen-
tives associated with the existence of debt). 
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One important interest-aligning mechanism in particular should 
be noted. Private equity firms typically make equity investments 
in their funds alongside their limited partner investors, and, 
thus, they face some downside risk to bad investments.97 The 
amount invested varies, but is usually around one percent of the 
total capital of the fund.98 In the extreme situation where all of 
a fund’s portfolio companies decreased in value to $0, the private 
equity firm would lose all of its equity investment in the fund.  
However, the structure of private equity makes this inter-
est-aligning mechanism a limited one. The amount invested by 
private equity firms makes up a small percentage of the total 
capital of the fund, and thus, there will always be a range of ex-
pected values in which the private equity firm will have an eco-
nomic interest in making acquisitions that have net negative re-
turns. So long as management fees remain a significant 
component of compensation, this moral hazard will persist. 
2. Carried Interest 
Management fees, however, are not the sole source of com-
pensation-based misalignment. The other important source of 
compensation for private equity firms is carried interest. Carried 
interest has been the subject of much debate in recent years, 
much of it focused on the favorable tax treatment it receives un-
der the U.S. tax code.99 Less attention, however, has been fo-
cused on the powerful ways in which carried interest can create 
incentives for excessive risk-taking by private equity firms. 
As explained before, carried interest is a kind of perfor-
mance-based compensation arrangement. Through its carried 
interest, a private equity firm earns a specified percentage of its 
fund’s profits, typically in the range of twenty percent.100 Carried 
 
 97. See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 5, at 123 (noting that the general 
partner customarily provides a portion of the fund’s capital). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Critics have argued that carried interest, which is taxed at the low long-
term capital gains rate of twenty percent under the current tax regime, should 
instead qualify as regular income and therefore be taxed a top rate of nearly 
forty percent. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership 
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008). Proponents of the 
current, favorable tax treatment of carried interest argue instead that carried 
interest is sweat equity much like any other interest in a company, and thus 
rightly qualifies as capital gains. See, e.g., Steven B. Klinsky, The Carried In-
terest Loophole? What Loophole?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 15, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/dealbook/the-carried-interest 
-loophole-what-loophole.html. 
 100. Weisbach, supra note 87, at 716.  
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interest is often viewed as a way of properly aligning the interest 
of private equity firms with their limited partner investors.101 
After all, investors commit their capital to private equity funds 
in the expectation of profits, and they naturally want to incen-
tivize private equity firms to pursue these profits. 
But the equity interests held by investors and the carried 
interests held by private equity firms differ in one important 
way: the equity interests face downside risk, while the carried 
interests do not.102 If a portfolio company drops in value and thus 
the private equity fund loses money, the equity investors in the 
fund will bear that loss, but the carried interest will simply not 
be triggered. Thus the private equity firm has upside potential 
but no downside potential—at worst, its carried interest will be 
equal to zero.103 As with the management-fee arrangement, this 
is a classic example of moral hazard. 
To return to the example from earlier, let us assume that 
Empire Capital has purchased Lemon Corp. for $1 billion. After 
acquiring the company, Empire Capital discovers that its earlier 
assessment of the range of expected values for Lemon Corp. is 
incorrect. Instead, it now believes that it has a choice: it can ei-
ther implement a radical restructuring of Lemon Corp., or it can 
stay the course. If it stays the course, Lemon Corp. will remain 
at a value of $1 billion at the time of exit. If it adopts the risky 
restructuring, there is a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. 
will drop in value to $400 million, and a fifty percent chance that 
Lemon Corp. will increase in value to $1.4 billion. 
The risky strategy has a negative expected value: if Empire 
Capital adopts this strategy, its expected value will be $900 mil-
lion, less than the value it could be guaranteed from simply stay-
ing the course. Thus the equity investors in the company would 
prefer that Empire Capital not implement the risky restructur-
ing of Lemon Corp. 
 
 101. See BAKS & BENVENISTE, supra note 90, at 3 (concluding that “[t]o pre-
serve the improvements in interest alignment currently underway, the PE mar-
ket would be served well if it would transition to a clearing mechanism in which 
top performing GPs are rewarded with increased carried interest” with the goal 
being to “de-emphasize management fees as a compensation channel for the 
GP”). 
 102. See Weisbach, supra note 87, at 716 (noting that the firm earns a per-
centage of the profits earned by the fund). 
 103. Of course, private equity firms invest time and energy into their port-
folio companies, so to the extent that they do not earn carried interest on their 
investments, this is a loss in a certain sense (in the form of opportunity costs). 
It is not, however, equivalent to the loss faced by equity investors, who ulti-
mately receive back less capital than they contributed. 
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But the economic interests of Empire Capital are different. 
If Empire Capital stays the course, there will be no potential for 
profit from the fund, and thus the private equity firm will not 
realize any carried interest. If, instead, it adopts the risky strat-
egy, there is a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. will in-
crease in value to $1.4 billion, in which case it will earn twenty 
percent of this profit through its carried interest in the fund. To 
be sure, there is also a fifty percent chance that Lemon Corp. will 
decrease in value, but this loss is not borne by Empire Capital 
as its carried interest is effectively a profits interest, and thus 
cannot drop below zero. Therefore, the expected value to Empire 
Capital of implementing the strategy is positive (twenty percent 
of the $400 million profit, or $80 million). The economic interest 
of Empire Capital, then, is to adopt the risky strategy, even 
though this strategy is, on average, value-destroying. 
The carried interest element of private equity compensation 
creates a moral hazard problem in the private equity industry 
that in many ways mirrors the critiques leveled against the 
banking industry after the financial crisis of 2008–2009.104 In 
that crisis, many observers noted that bankers’ pay incentivized 
excessive risk-taking—bankers stood to receive large bonuses if 
they made risky, leveraged bets on the housing market, but were 
insulated from any negative repercussions because their institu-
tions were considered too big to fail.105 Private equity firms face 
similar incentives. They too have a financial interest in taking 
excessive risks because they capture much of the upside (in a 
typical structure, twenty percent of the profits of the invest-
ments) with little of the downside, as they will merely forfeit the 
possibility of earning their carried interest while still pocketing 
the ongoing management fees that they have been charging 
throughout the investment period. 
Another way of understanding the problem is to view the 
carry as effectively an option. Options give their holders the 
 
 104. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9 (exploring how banks’ compen-
sation structures produce incentives for excessive risk taking).  
 105. See DAVID F. LARCKER ET AL., FOLLOW THE MONEY: COMPENSATION, 
RISK, AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES: 1–3 (Sept. 8, 
2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer 
-look-43-risk-compensation-financial-crisis.pdf (discussing incentives for bank-
ers to engage in risky conduct). 
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right to buy a share at a future date for a specified price.106 Op-
tions are often viewed as a way to link pay with performance—
the options only have value if the stock price rises.107 However, 
it is increasingly recognized that options incentivize excessive 
risk-taking among public-company executives and lead to meas-
urable changes in a company’s risk profile.108 By basing execu-
tive compensation on increases in share prices, and making them 
indifferent between different-sized decreases, stock options cre-
ate financial incentives for executives to pursue risky strategies 
that may have negative expected values. Carried interests create 
similar, though perhaps less widely-recognized, incentives for 
private equity firms to increase risk in their portfolio companies. 
Many private equity funds attempt to minimize the misa-
lignment created by carried interests through a mechanism 
called a hurdle rate.109 Hurdle rate provisions prevent private 
equity firms from earning any carried interest until the limited 
partners have realized a specified profit on their capital contri-
butions. This number is commonly around eight percent, mean-
ing that, until limited-partner investors have realized a return 
of eight percent on their capital, the private equity firm earns no 
carried interest.110 Hurdle rates provide additional assurance to 
limited-partner investors that they will realize a reasonable re-
turn on their investments before private equity firms earn their 
carry, but, perversely, they also end up exacerbating the moral 
 
 106. See Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Pro-
posal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 31, 32 (1997) (discussing the use of stock option grants as compensation). 
 107. See Richard A. Booth, Why Stock Options Are the Best Form of Executive 
Compensation (And How to Make Them Even Better), 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 281, 
281 (2010) (arguing that options are the best way to align CEO and shareholder 
incentives); Steve Cross, Keep Employees Incentivized, Align Pay with Perfor-
mance from the Bottom Up, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2010), https://www.forbes.com/ 
2010/11/29/incentive-based-compensation-stock-options-markets-equity 
-participation-incentivization.html#25b9929ba85e (discussing the productivity 
benefits of employee stock options). 
 108. Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1A HAND-
BOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 432, 527–29 (George M. Constantinides 
et al. eds., 2003); Carl R. Chen et al., Does Stock Option-Based Executive Com-
pensation Induce Risk Taking? An Analysis of the Banking Industry, 30 J. BANK-
ING & FIN. 915, 943 (2006); see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial 
Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 751, 751 (2002) (discussing the opportunity for rent extraction in exec-
utive compensation). 
 109. See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 86, at 2310 (discussing how carry 
hurdles work in practice). 
 110. See id. at 2312 (using an eight percent hurdle rate in explaining how 
hurdle requirements are applied). 
 1874 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1847 
 
hazard problem.111 Even with a hurdle provision, private equity 
firms still do not face downside risk, but they now have an in-
centive to layer on additional risk in order to surpass the hurdle. 
B. LIMITED GOVERNANCE RIGHTS FOR INVESTORS 
The compensation structure of private equity presents a 
moral hazard that misaligns the economic interests of private 
equity firms and their investors, incentivizing risky strategies 
and value-destroying behavior. Parties usually address these 
types of moral hazard through enhanced monitoring of the rele-
vant behavior. If the party with an incentive to misbehave knows 
that bad acts will be identified and punished, he may refrain 
from engaging in the behavior in the first place. But, as this Sec-
tion will demonstrate, private equity is typified by severely lim-
ited governance rights for investors, reducing the ability of in-
vestors to monitor private-equity-firm behavior and thereby 
exacerbating the moral hazard problem.112 
1. Lack of Voice 
Investors in private equity funds have very little say in the 
way that their funds are run.113 Unlike shareholders in public 
corporations, who benefit from extensive voting rights on a vari-
ety of matters,114 private equity investors have little or no ability 
 
 111. Larry Swedroe, Moral Hazard in Hedge Fund Fees, ETF.COM (Mar. 8, 
2017), http://www.etf.com/sections/index-investor-corner/swedroe-moral 
-hazard-hedge-fund-fees (“[F]eatures of .  .  .  hurdle rate .  .  .  provisions . . . 
create an increased moral hazard . . .”).  
 112. For the classic description of the voice and exit problem in governance, 
see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE 
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 1–20 (1970) (discussing each of these 
governance problems). 
 113. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of In-
vestment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (2014) (not-
ing that investment enterprises such as private equity funds tend to “radically 
limit fund investors’ control”); Drury, supra note 28, at 60–62 (discussing inves-
tors’ governance rights in private equity firms). It should be noted at the outset 
that many private equity firms argue that limitations on governance rights are 
required in order to insulate limited partners from liability. After all, Delaware 
law provides that a limited partner will not be liable for the obligations of the 
partnership only for so long as they refrain from “participat[ing] in the control 
of the business.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(a) (2017). But Delaware law 
also provides an extensive list of actions that are expressly permitted for limited 
partners, and this list is significantly broader than any rights granted to limited 
partner investors in private equity. See id. at § 17-303(b).  
 114. Shareholders in public corporations typically have rights to vote on the 
election of directors, mergers, acquisitions, and executive compensation pack-
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to participate in fund governance. Instead, they delegate near-
complete control to private equity firms, which act as the general 
partners of the fund. The limited-partner investors are restricted 
to a short list of specifically enumerated voting rights, on such 
matters as the amendment of the limited partnership agree-
ment, the dissolution of the fund, or the removal of the general 
partner.115 As mentioned earlier, the rights of investors in pri-
vate equity funds are defined in the fund’s limited partnership 
agreement and any side letters that the investors may negotiate 
on their own.116 As such, investor rights are largely a creature of 
contract law, and not state or federal law as one finds with pub-
licly listed companies.117  
Of course, public corporations also have governing docu-
ments that lay out the respective rights and obligations of man-
agement and ownership, but there is a substantial public-law 
overlay that limits and shapes how far public corporations can 
go in restricting shareholder rights. These public company regu-
lations do not, however, protect investors in private equity 
funds.118 Instead, private equity investors only receive the bene-
fits of the participation rights that they can explicitly negotiate 
for prior to investment.  
And it turns out that those rights are few and far between. 
For example, investors typically have no right to vote on the sale 
of portfolio companies, even if those companies form a substan-
tial part of the fund’s assets.119 That decision resides solely 
within the discretion of the private equity firm. They typically 
have no right to vote on the board of directors with managerial 
 
ages, among other things. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Share-
holder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 416–18 (2006) (discussing shareholder voting 
rights). 
 115. See, e.g., DOUGLAS CUMMING & SOFIA JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL & PRI-
VATE EQUITY CONTRACTING app. 1, § 5.3 (2d ed. 2009) (providing a sample lim-
ited partnership agreement).  
 116. See supra Part I.A. 
 117. See Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 
34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 476–77 (2009) (noting that non-corporations such as 
private equity funds are “‘creatures of contract,’ representing a voluntary con-
tractual relationship among private parties”). 
 118. It should be noted that some private equity firms are publicly listed and 
thus would be subject to public-company regulation. Prominent examples in-
clude The Blackstone Group and KKR. See Drury, supra note 28, at 60 (discuss-
ing public offerings by these firms). These firms, however, remain in the minor-
ity. 
 119. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 5.3 (stating that the 
manager has full power and authority to act on behalf of the partnership). 
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authority reserved for the fund.120 Managerial authority is 
vested in the private equity firm. They typically have no right to 
vote on the compensation of executives.121 That decision also 
rests with the private equity firm in its sole discretion. These are 
all rights that, in some form or other, shareholders in public cor-
porations are guaranteed, but that very few private equity inves-
tors have. 
What rights investors do have in the governance of private 
equity funds are typically rigorously circumscribed. One com-
mon voting right that investors do have is the right to remove 
the private equity firm from its position as general partner of the 
fund.122 But that right is far from absolute. First, it typically 
must be for cause, meaning that investors can only remove the 
private equity firm if it misbehaves. This provision, on its face, 
would seem an unobjectionable way of aligning the interests of 
private equity firms and investors: the investors promise to keep 
the firm in place as long as it acts in the interests of the inves-
tors, but have the power to remove it if it does not. But limited 
partnership agreements commonly define cause so narrowly that 
it can only be invoked in the most extreme cases, such as fraud, 
willful misconduct, violations of law, felony convictions, or bad 
faith.123 Some agreements go even further, requiring there to be 
a final court determination confirming the general partner’s 
 
 120. Some private equity firms establish “limited partner advisory commit-
tees” that have certain limited rights to review the decisions of the general part-
ner. See INSTITUTIONAL LTD. PARTNERS ASS’N, PRIVATE EQUITY PRINCIPLES 13–
15 (2d ed. 2011), https://ilpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ILPA-Private 
-Equity-Principles-version-2.pdf (discussing attributes and best practices for 
LPACs). But these committees typically have an advisory role and are focused 
on vetting transactions that involve conflicts of interest for the private equity 
firm. In addition, not all limited partners have the right to nominate their rep-
resentatives to the committees; this right is often reserved for the few limited 
partners with the largest commitments and who have explicitly negotiated for 
such rights in their side letters. 
 121. See CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115 (detailing the authority of the 
partnership manager); see also Robert J. Jackson, Private Equity and Executive 
Compensation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 638, 668 (2013) (analyzing how executive com-
pensation in companies owned by private equity firms differs from executive 
compensation in public companies). 
 122. See Albert J. Hudec, Negotiating Private Equity Fund Terms: The Shift-
ing Balance of Power, 19 BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2010, at 48. 
 123. See Addison D. Braendel & Seth Chertok, Closed-End Private Equity 
Funds: A Detailed Overview of Fund Business Terms, Part II, 13 J. PRIVATE 
EQUITY 57, 68 (2010) (discussing how cause is usually defined). 
 2018] THE PUBLIC COST OF PRIVATE EQUITY 1877 
 
misbehavior before investors can remove the firm.124 And, add-
ing yet another obstacle, the voting threshold for invoking a for-
cause removal is often set at prohibitively high levels—as high 
as eighty-five percent to ninety-five percent of the vote.125  
Put together, these restrictions and limitations effectively 
eliminate the ability of private equity investors to voice their 
opinions and participate in essential business decisions of the 
funds that they own. Near total control is vested in the private 
equity firm itself. This governance arrangement raises questions 
about the proper alignment of interests between private equity 
firms and their investors, and whether institutional investors 
are adequately able to monitor and sanction private equity firm 
behavior. 
The inability of private equity investors to participate in 
governance decisions might be less worrisome if they were pro-
tected by strong fiduciary duties. Indeed, the default rule in 
many jurisdictions is that general partners owe the same fiduci-
ary duties to limited partners that directors of corporations owe 
to shareholders.126 But many limited partnership agreements 
require investors to waive any fiduciary duties that the private 
equity firm might otherwise have, thus depriving private equity 
investors of this judicial check on misbehavior.127  
Paradoxically, some scholars have argued that the inability 
of investors to participate in governance decisions is one of the 
primary benefits of the private equity model.128 In this line of 
thought, control of company decisions should reside in the hands 
of the most efficient and knowledgeable decision-makers.129 Be-
cause private equity firms have deep knowledge of the industries 
 
 124. Henry Riffe, General Partner Removal Provisions, TRIANGLE FUNDS, 
https://trianglefunds.com/general-partner-removal-provisions (last visited Apr. 
14, 2018). 
 125. See Hudec, supra note 122. Adding to the problem, the private equity 
firm itself may own limited-partner interests that have a right to vote on these 
matters, posing an obvious conflict of interest. 
 126. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2017); see also Larry E. 
Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements, 37 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 927, 930–31 (2004) (arguing against fiduciary duty waiver re-
strictions for limited partnerships). 
 127. See de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 181 (noting that private equity firms 
have “deliberately avoided” fiduciary duties toward their investors); see also 
Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 25, at 51–53 (discussing the flexibility to 
waive fiduciary duty under partnership law); Manesh, supra note 117 (noting 
that noncorporations rely on contractual rather than fiduciary rights).  
 128. Morley, supra note 113. 
 129. Id. at 1232–33. 
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in which they operate and the market conditions necessary for 
their funds to profit, control most efficiently resides in their 
hands, and not in those of institutional investors who have nei-
ther the will nor the ability to focus on day-to-day affairs at their 
numerous investments. But this model only works when (1) 
managers have strong performance incentives; and (2) investors 
have strong exit rights.130 Otherwise, the surrender of control 
can operate as a license for rent extraction by the manager. But, 
as already described in Part II.A, while the performance incen-
tives for private equity firms may well be strong, they are not 
perfectly aligned with the interests of investors. The next Section 
will discuss the lack of exit rights for investors in private equity 
funds. 
2. Lack of Exit 
Private equity investors lack a second important protection 
against overreaching by private equity firms—the right to leave. 
The right to leave, or exit, an investment is a particularly pow-
erful method for disciplining the behavior of managers.131 In a 
public corporation, for example, if large numbers of shareholders 
sell their shares, the value of the corporation’s shares will de-
cline, reflecting poorly on the corporation’s management and 
shrinking the value of management’s equity holdings. As long as 
managers’ compensation is tied closely enough to the perfor-
mance of the company’s share price, the threat of exit by large 
shareholders can serve as a financial incentive for managers to 
act in the interest of shareholders broadly. In other words, in-
vestors’ ability to exit a company may serve as an effective sub-
stitute for their ability to vote in the company.  
Exit or the threat of exit, already a potent tool in disciplining 
the managers of public corporations, could potentially be even 
more powerful in the context of private equity, for at least two 
reasons. First, private equity firms earn a substantial portion of 
their compensation through management fees, which are calcu-
lated as a percentage of the total amount of capital that investors 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 25, at 53–54 (describing the 
right to exit an investment as “essential for imposing discipline upon manag-
ers”); see also Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and 
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2676–
77 (2009). 
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have committed.132 So, if investors were to withdraw their capi-
tal commitments, this reduction would directly affect the bottom 
line for private equity firms through diminished management 
fees.133 Second, the other substantial portion of private equity 
firm compensation is based on the firm’s carried interest, or prof-
its from the sale of portfolio companies.134 If it were to become 
known that a number of large investors had sold their invest-
ments in the firm’s fund, this news could very well adversely af-
fect the reputation of the firm and hinder efforts to entice buyers 
or undertake an initial public offering for their portfolio compa-
nies. The difficulty of selling portfolio companies is a major con-
cern for private equity firms and is one of the reasons for the 
proliferation in recent years of so-called zombie funds, or funds 
that have held their portfolio companies for longer than their 
scheduled holding periods.135 
Despite the potentially powerful effects of exit as a method 
for reducing agency costs in the private equity industry, inves-
tors in private equity funds have essentially no ability to sell 
their investments in a timely way. Most limited partnership 
agreements provide that limited partners may not transfer their 
interests in the fund for the life of the fund (often ten to twelve 
years) unless the general partner consents to the transfer.136 As 
a result, private equity firms can veto any efforts by investors to 
sell their interests in the fund. Needless to say, private equity 
 
 132. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 86, at 2309. 
 133. Of course, after the investment period has ended, management fees typ-
ically switch to being calculated as capital actually invested. See supra Part 
II.A.1. 
 134. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 135. See Jennifer Bollen, Zombie Private Equity Funds Sit on $127 Billion 
Asset Pile, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/ 
07/31/zombie-private-equity-funds-sit-on-127-billion-asset-pile. 
 136. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 9.2 (“No sale, assign-
ment, transfer, exchange, pledge, encumbrance or other disposition . . . of all or 
any part of the . . . Limited Partner ’s interest . . . in the Partnership . . . shall 
be valid or effective without the prior written consent of the Manager. . . .”). Of-
ten, the decision of whether to consent to such a transfer resides in the sole 
discretion of the private equity firm, thus allowing the private equity firm to 
block transfers for any or no reason at all. To the extent that limited partners 
negotiate for better transfer terms, these negotiations typically take place in the 
context of side letters that apply solely to the specific limited partner requesting 
the better terms, and not in the context of the wider limited partnership agree-
ment itself. See James Gaden, Side Stepping Side Letters?, MAPLES & CALDER 
(Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.maplesandcalder.com/news/article/side-stepping 
-side-letters-483. 
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firms’ power to veto transfers renders exit rights largely ineffec-
tual and significantly impairs the potentially disciplining effects 
of exit on management behavior.137 
It should be noted that exit is a controversial mechanism for 
disciplining management behavior. Some scholars, for example, 
have argued that greater liquidity actually impairs corporate 
governance.138 By making it easier for investors to sell their in-
vestments, greater exit rights reduce the incentive for investors 
to play a constructive role in the governance of those invest-
ments.139 Another reason for restricting exit rights is related to 
the trade-off between short-term and long-term profits. The logic 
here is that as executives become more attuned to share price 
fluctuations, they spend less time focusing on the larger, more 
important function of running the company for long-term 
growth, and more focused on short-term, illusory bumps in share 
prices.140 Indeed, the reaction against short-termism in public 
 
 137. Investors can generally withdraw their capital at the end of the term of 
the fund. But a typical term for a private equity fund is ten years, and can some-
times extend for longer. See STEPHANIE R. BRESLOW & PHYLLIS A. SCHWARTZ, 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: FORMATION AND OPERATION § 2:18.1 (2011) (“A stand-
ard private equity term ends on the tenth anniversary of the final closing of the 
sale of partnership interest by the fund. Thereafter, the general partner may 
have the right to extend the term of the partnership for a stated period.”). This 
means that investors can have their capital tied up for over a decade before they 
have any ability to access it. 
 138. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional In-
vestors as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991). Of course, another 
reason for restricting the ability of investors to exit their investments in private 
equity funds is that the fund’s investments are illiquid. Private equity funds 
invest in whole companies, and thus they are not able to sell small portions of 
their holdings to satisfy withdrawal requests in the ways that mutual funds and 
hedge funds may. However, given the increasing demand for secondary market 
sales of private equity interests, it is unclear that a complete prohibition on 
sales of fund interests to willing third buyers is necessary or desirable. A robust 
secondary market would promote the exchangeability of private equity interests 
and could do a better job of holding firms accountable for their actions. 
 139. Id. at 1288–89. Exit and voice are often viewed as alternatives, with 
voice serving as a substitute for exit. But in private equity, both of these ave-
nues for cabining managerial discretion are sharply circumscribed. 
 140. See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. 
LAW. 101, 104 (1979) (contrasting short-term perspectives of professional inves-
tors with long-term interests of shareholders and management); Martin Lipton 
& Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 78 (2003); see also Sanjai Bhagat 
& Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Commit-
ting to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009) (recommending changes 
to executive compensation structures that incentivize practices creating long-
term value, rather than short-term price appreciation); William W. Bratton & 
Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. 
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corporations has often been cited as a reason for corporations to 
go private in the first place. For example, when Silver Lake Man-
agement teamed up with Michael Dell to buy Dell Inc. and take 
the technology giant private, they stated as one of their primary 
reasons the ability to make changes without concern for short-
term price fluctuations and fickle investor demands.141 
Regardless of whether we believe that executives make bet-
ter or worse decisions when investors have the ability to sell 
their investments in the company, the strong transfer re-
strictions placed on investors in private equity mean that inves-
tors lack yet another basic method for protecting themselves 
from management misbehavior. No matter what they think of a 
private equity firm’s performance, exit is not an option. 
3. Lack of Information 
The private equity corporate-governance structure thus 
lacks two important mechanisms for constraining managers and 
reducing agency costs: voice and exit. But even if investors are 
able to negotiate for greater voice and exit rights (a possibility 
that will be discussed in the Part II.C), they lack the means to 
exercise those rights effectively. This is because private equity 
firms restrict the flow of information about the performance and 
structure of their funds both to and among investors.142 And 
without comprehensive and timely information about their in-
vestment, private equity investors stand little chance of moni-
toring management behavior.143  
 
L. REV. 653, 696–703 (2010) (discussing information asymmetry between exec-
utives and the investing public and the effect on investing patterns). But see 
Fried, supra note 46 (arguing that managers serving the interests of long-term 
shareholders may generate less economic value over time than managers focus-
ing on serving the interests of short-term shareholders). 
 141. Michael Dell, Going Private Is Paying Off for Dell, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 
2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-dell-going-private-is-paying-off-for 
-dell-1416872851. 
 142. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 11 (outlining the limited 
information provided to limited partners).  
 143. In a recent review of the private equity industry, the SEC found that 
“most limited partnership agreements do not provide limited partners with suf-
ficient information rights to be able to adequately monitor not only their invest-
ments, but also the operations of their manager,” and that “[w]hile investors 
typically conduct substantial due diligence before investing in a fund, . . . inves-
tor oversight is generally much more lax after closing.” Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., 
Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC, Address at the Private 
Equity International Private Fund Compliance Forum: Spreading Sunshine in 
Private Equity (May 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014 
--spch05062014ab.html. 
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Investors in public corporations have access to extensive in-
formation about the companies that they own. Securities regula-
tions require public companies to file annual reports (10-Ks), 
quarterly reports (10-Qs), and additional reports upon the occur-
rence of certain key events (8-Ks). This information covers every 
conceivable part of a company’s business: developments in oper-
ations; risk factors; properties; legal proceedings; financial data; 
management discussion and analysis of financial conditions; ex-
ecutive compensation; related-party transactions; and other in-
formation.144 Put together, these requirements give sharehold-
ers an extensive view into the nature and performance of their 
company. 
Private equity investors, on the other hand, do not receive 
the same extensive disclosures about their investment. Typical 
limited partnership agreements require private equity firms to 
provide investors with only barebones information about the 
fund: annual and quarterly reports that include a balance sheet, 
profit and loss account, and summary of investments, as well as 
information about investments bought and sold.145 This infor-
mation is not subject to the same rigorous standards of review 
and liability that public-company disclosures are subject to, and 
indeed the disclosure practices of private equity firms have been 
the subject of SEC investigations in recent years.146 Some schol-
ars have even argued that important aspects of the private eq-
uity structure today can only be explained as an attempt to es-
cape the reach of antifraud rules under the securities laws.147 
But even the limited information disclosures that private 
equity investors are entitled to come saddled with myriad cave-
ats and carve outs.148 For example, some limited partnership 
agreements go so far as to allow the private equity firm, in its 
sole discretion, to deny limited partners any information that 
 
 144. See Form 10-K, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2018). 
 145. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 11 (providing an exam-
ple of the limited information typically provided to limited partners).  
 146. See Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees., N.Y. 
TIMES, at BU1, May 25, 2014 (discussing recent SEC investigations of private 
equity firms). 
 147. See James C. Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, and at What 
Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2009) (arguing that, for private equity, 
“[s]taying below the regulatory radar is paramount”). 
 148. See Hudec, supra note 122, at 48 (“Traditional limited partnership 
agreements do not have expansive information rights and tricky confidentiality 
obligations make robust information flow difficult to come by.”). 
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might adversely affect the private equity firm.149 In addition, in-
vestors are often prohibited from even learning about the iden-
tities, investment amounts, or investment terms of other inves-
tors.150 
Not only is the right to information prescribed, but the right 
to share such information with others is similarly limited.151 
Limited partnership agreements often include confidentiality 
provisions with sweeping restrictions on the disclosure to third 
parties of a wide array of information that is considered confi-
dential, including partnership terms, the identity of other lim-
ited partners, and side arrangements with the general part-
ner.152 These types of provisions prevent limited partners from 
discussing business matters with other limited partners, effec-
tively prohibiting the investors from cooperating. 
Through these mechanisms, private equity firms have cut 
the flow of information to investors down to a trickle. With such 
limited information, investors find it difficult to detect and pun-
ish rent-seeking behavior by the private equity firm managers. 
So even when investors succeed in negotiating for greater exit 
and voice rights, a daunting task in itself, they struggle to exer-
cise those rights effectively without better information about the 
behavior and performance of the firm. 
If there is any doubt about whether the information problem 
is purely theoretical, consider the following fact: in the last few 
years, several prominent private equity firms have been fined by 
the SEC for improper disclosure and fee practices.153 That list 
 
 149. See MARTIN I. LUBAROFF & PAUL M. ALTMAN, LUBAROFF & ALTMAN ON 
DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 5-24 to -26 (2018). 
 150. See, e.g., CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 15.5 (providing an ex-
ample of confidentiality requirements often placed on limited partners). 
 151. The confidentiality of limited partnership agreements is a matter of 
some controversy. Many private equity firms argue that the terms of their lim-
ited partnership agreements are a matter of competitive advantage, and any 
disclosure outside the fund would damage the firm’s ability to invest and gen-
erate returns for investors. See Steve Judge, Confidentiality of Limited Partner-
ship Agreements Is Paramount, PE HUB NETWORK (Nov. 3, 2014), https:// 
www.pehub.com/2014/11/confidentiality-of-limited-partnership-agreements-is 
-paramount. But others have argued that these claims are overblown and that 
the real reason for the extreme secrecy around limited partnership agreements 
is that disclosing their tax and fee structures would subject private equity firms 
to criticism. See Dan Primack, Private Equity’s False Argument for Confidenti-
ality, FORTUNE (Nov. 25, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/11/25/private-equitys 
-false-argument-for-document-secrecy.  
 152. See CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, § 11.  
 153. In 2016, Apollo Global Management paid a $53 million fine to the SEC 
in order to settle allegations that it misled investors about its fees, improperly 
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includes three of the four largest private equity firms in the 
world: Apollo, Blackstone, and KKR.154 The fourth, Carlyle, has 
received a request from the SEC for additional information about 
its fee practices.155 This trend of improper disclosures by private 
equity firms to the detriment of investors suggests that infor-
mation flows are indeed problematic and, at the very least, must 
be improved to prevent false or inaccurate disclosures. 
C. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF INVESTORS 
As the previous Sections have demonstrated, the structure 
of private equity carries with it two important governance costs: 
compensation-based moral hazard and inhibited governance 
rights for investors, both of which exacerbate agency costs be-
tween investors and private equity firms. But one final govern-
ance cost of the private equity model not only increases the se-
verity of these problems, but also introduces a separate 
tension—intra-investor conflict. This is the increasingly common 
strategy of granting different treatment to different investors.156 
It is a bedrock principle of corporate law that similarly situ-
ated shareholders should be treated similarly.157 This equal 
 
accelerated the payment of such fees into lump-sum payments, reduced the 
amount available for distribution to fund investors, and failed to fully disclose 
these practices to investors. See Ben Protess, Apollo Global Settles Securities 
Case as the S.E.C. Issues $53 Million Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2016, at B3. In 
2015, Blackstone Group LP agreed to pay a $39 million fine in connection with 
insufficient disclosures to investors about the fees it collected from the sale of 
portfolio companies and discounts on legal fees that were not distributed out to 
investors. See Lisa Beilfuss & Aruna Viswanatha, Blackstone in $39 Million 
SEC Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
blackstone-settles-with-sec-over-certain-fee-practices-1444238653. Also in 
2015, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. agreed to pay $30 million to settle allega-
tions that it had improperly allocated excessive “broken-deal” costs to investor 
funds. See Mark Maremont, KKR Agrees to $30 Million SEC Settlement, WALL 
ST. J. (June 29, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kkr-settles-with-sec-for 
-nearly-30-million-1435592880. 
 154. J.B. Maverick, World’s Top 10 Private Equity Firms, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/011116/worlds 
-top-10-private-equity-firms-apo-bx.asp (citing Apollo Global Management, 
Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, and KKR & Co. as the four largest equity 
firms).  
 155. Carlyle Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2016), at 35.  
 156. See generally Clayton, supra note 12.  
 157. See REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: 
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 96 (3d ed. 2009) (“The equal treat-
ment of shares (and shareholders) of the same class is a fundamental norm of 
corporate law.”); Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate 
Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1074 (1983) (stating 
that it is a “part of the received learning about publicly held corporations” that 
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treatment principle is incorporated in both federal158 and state 
law.159 While certain exceptions exist, most obviously in the case 
of common versus preferred shares,160 most shareholders can as-
sume that they are entitled to the same distributions and voting 
rights as other holders of their class of shares. This principle of 
equal treatment is motivated by concerns about entrenchment 
and favoritism, and, more generally, the diversion of corporate 
assets to majority or controlling shareholders at the expense of 
other shareholders. In other words, the equal-treatment norm is 
aimed at preventing value-reducing forms of opportunism by 
managers and large shareholders.161 
Private equity firms, however, are not bound by the same 
norms of equal treatment and, indeed, often grant different and 
more favorable treatment to certain investors in their funds.162 
While all investors sign the same limited partnership agree-
ment—a document that purports to set forth the relative rights 
and obligations of the partners—private equity firms also nego-
tiate side letters with individual investors in their funds.163 
 
“all shares of a particular class (e.g., common stock) are to be treated as homo-
geneous claims on enterprise wealth”). But see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DAN-
IEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 110 (1991) 
(stating that “[m]any scholars, though few courts, conclude that one aspect of 
fiduciary duty is the equal treatment of investors”). 
 158. See SEC Equal Treatment of Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 
(“No bidder shall make a tender offer unless: (1) The tender offer is open to all 
security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer; and (2) The 
consideration paid to any security holder for securities tendered in the tender 
offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder for securities 
tendered in the tender offer.”). 
 159. See Odyssey Partners v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 406 (Del. Ch. 1999) 
(concluding that “general principles of our law disfavor[ ] non-prorata distribu-
tions of corporate assets”); Stephenson v. Dreyer, 947 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Cal. 
1997) (“Any use to which [majority shareholders] put the corporation or their 
power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately 
and must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation’s business.”). 
 160. Needless to say, corporations often have more than one class of shares, 
and these shares may well have different voting and economic rights. In addi-
tion, Delaware law allows boards to discriminate between shareholders in the 
use of poison pills in order to fend off threats to the corporation. See Moran v. 
Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).  
 161. See James D. Cox, Equal Treatment for Shareholders, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 615, 615–16 (1997) (contrasting equal treatment of all shareholders with 
“opportunistic” management practices). 
 162. See Clayton, supra note 12, at 252 (noting that “[p]referential treatment 
of investors is more common than ever in [private equity], thanks to new struc-
tures that make it easier to grant different terms to different investors”). 
 163. See id. at 261 (discussing the prevalence of “customized contracting” in 
private equity). 
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These side letters can amend, supplement, or even contradict, 
the terms that are provided in the limited partnership agree-
ment.164 Through the negotiation of these side letters, preferen-
tial treatment is often given to repeat investors or large institu-
tional clients.165 
Common provisions in these side letters include lower fees 
and expenses for individual investors, opt-out rights for proposed 
investments in restricted industries, and greater control and 
monitoring rights.166 Some side letters include so-called most-
favored-nation provisions, which require private equity firms to 
give beneficiaries the benefit of any provision included in other 
investors’ side letters, effectively ensuring that they receive any 
preferential treatment granted to others.167 Another common 
provision allows institutional investors to co-invest in portfolio 
companies, allowing these preferred investors to participate di-
rectly in deals originated by the private equity fund.168 Many of 
 
 164. Id. at 263–64. 
 165. See Marco DaRin & Ludovic Phalippou, There Is Something Special 
About Large Investors: Evidence from a Survey of Private Equity Limited Part-
ners 5 (TILEC, Discussion Paper No. 2014-010) (finding that a significantly 
higher percentage of large investors receive side letters and other preferential 
provisions than smaller investors); Barry Steinman, Private Equity Fund Fees, 
DUANE MORRIS LLP PRESENTATION, at slide 7 (Aug. 2014), http://www 
.duanemorris.com/site/static/private_equity_fund_fees.pdf (noting that large in-
vestors are often charged reduced management fees). 
 166. See Clayton, supra note 12, at 261–65. 
 167. Such most-favored-nation clauses are commonly commitment-based, 
meaning that an investor only has the right to receive the benefits given to in-
vestors that have committed to invest similar or smaller amounts of capital. In 
this way, smaller investors do not have the right to elect to receive the favorable 
terms given to large investors. See ZACHARY K. BARNETT ET AL., MAYER BROWN, 
MOST FAVORED NATIONS CLAUSES: POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SUBSCRIPTION-
BACKED CREDIT FACILITIES 3 (2015), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/ 
Publication/fad2b171-3af5-4e21-8e0d-03a1b11d1ee2/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/3f05a730-9157-4777-af22-03d9306ea290/Most_ 
Favored_Nations_Clauses.pdf; Thomas Volet, Most-Favored-Nation Effects in 
Private Equity: Uncertain, LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/625684/most-favored-nation-effects-in-private-equity-uncertain. 
 168. See Lily Fang et al., The Disintermediation of Financial Markets: Direct 
Investing in Private Equity, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 160, 160 (2015) (discussing the 
prevalence of co-investments among large institutional investors). Some of the 
biggest beneficiaries of co-investment agreements are foreign investors, such as 
sovereign wealth funds and pension plans. See Reuters, Private Equity Firms 
Struck Hushed Deals with Foreign Funds, FORTUNE (Aug. 30, 2016), http:// 
fortune.com/2016/08/30/private-equity-hushed-deals-sec (identifying Singa-
pore’s sovereign wealth fund GIC and the Canadian pension fund Canada Pen-
sion Plan Investment Board as beneficiaries of co-investment arrangements). 
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these arrangements go undisclosed to other, less-preferred in-
vestors in the fund.169 
Given the differential treatment of investors, it is not sur-
prising that limited-partner investors in private equity receive 
widely varying returns from their investments. One study found 
that endowments, a group that is generally viewed as a preferred 
investor by private equity firms, receive twenty-one percent 
greater returns than the average return for all investors in pri-
vate equity funds.170 And even within the same fund, investors 
can receive significantly different returns, based on manage-
ment-fee discounts and rebates.171 
Side letters and other arrangements for differential treat-
ment of investors thus raise the distinct possibility that fund as-
sets will be diverted to preferred investors at the expense of non-
preferred investors. This possibility creates a fundamental 
conflict between limited partners as they attempt to negotiate 
the terms of their investment. Investors may be willing to accept 
less favorable terms generally in the limited partnership agree-
ment, as long as they can be assured that they will receive better 
treatment individually in their side letters.  
Perhaps even more importantly, in this age of indirect eq-
uity ownership, the prospect of preferential treatment for insider 
investors minimizes, and may eliminate, the vital role that large, 
sophisticated investors play as guardians of equityholder rights 
in the governance process.172 Activist investors have served as 
important agents for change in the governance practices of pub-
lic companies today, but they might well never have created this 
change if managers had had the option of buying them off 
through privately negotiated side-bargains.173 Generally, large 
 
 169. See Reuters, supra note 168 (noting that failing to disclose preferred 
terms to smaller investors may lead to scrutiny from the SEC). 
 170. Josh Lerner et al., Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited 
Partner Performance Puzzle, 62 J. FIN. 731, 733 (2007). 
 171. See Timothy Spangler, Deconstructing Management Fees in Alternative 
Funds, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timothyspangler/ 
2014/08/19/deconstructing-management-fees-in-alternative-funds (“[I]nvestors 
in the same fund can have materially different returns based on discounts ob-
tained against fees.”). 
 172. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Econom-
ics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 47–49 (2012) (concluding 
that the empirical evidence strongly supports the view that large blockholders 
improve corporate governance and benefit investors). 
 173. The practice of greenmail, or purchasing a large block of shares and 
then pressuring a board to buy those shares back at a premium or face a proxy 
contest, has been roundly condemned and indeed has been the target of several 
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equityholders have a greater incentive to monitor management 
behavior than small equityholders because they will be able to 
capture a greater percentage of the benefits from any changes.174 
But if private equity firms can pay off large investors in return 
for their looking the other way on marginally higher transaction 
or monitoring fees, then the incentive for collectively desirable, 
but individually costly, monitoring decreases. 
The argument in favor of preferential treatment for certain 
investors, of course, is that it allows for more customized pricing 
and terms.175 Just as price discrimination by companies can lead 
to more efficient results, contract discrimination by private eq-
uity can increase the scope and size of investments by prospec-
tive investors.176 If a certain investor is prohibited from invest-
ing in payday-lending companies, then the private equity firm 
can grant that investor an exemption from any such invest-
ments, without resorting to the extreme measure of entirely ex-
cluding the investor from the fund. These kinds of side agree-
ments can improve efficiency and encourage value-creating 
transactions between willing parties. Thus, where private equity 
firms can discriminate between investors and charge them dif-
ferent prices, the result may be efficiency enhancing to the ex-
tent it allows more investors to participate in the market.  
But the very existence of price discrimination in the private 
equity market is evidence that the market is not functioning 
properly.177 It is a widely recognized axiom that where a market 
is perfectly competitive (that is, good information exists about 
the market, no barriers to entry prevent new firms from compet-
ing, and no other fundamental market failure is present), price 
discrimination should not be able to exist, as individual firms 
 
state laws effectively prohibiting the practice. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1707.043 (2008) (requiring disgorgement of profits from greenmail); 
15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2571–76 (2008) (requiring disgorgement of profits ac-
quired through greenmail). 
 174. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that small investors free ride 
the monitoring provided by large shareholders, gaining the benefits without 
paying the costs. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder 
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 633 (2006). 
 175. See Clayton, supra note 12, at 155–57 (outlining the effects of offering 
preferential terms for select investors). 
 176. See generally id. (suggesting that contract discrimination favors large 
investors to begin with, and preferred terms may encourage larger and repeat 
investments).  
 177. See Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HAND-
BOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2221 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter 
eds., 2007). 
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have no ability to affect market prices.178 The presence of price 
discrimination, on the other hand, is strong evidence that disa-
bling market failures (such as monopoly power or information 
asymmetries) are present in an industry.179 Thus the fact that 
private equity firms are discriminating between investors, favor-
ing some over others, not only reveals a fundamental conflict 
among investors, but also reveals that market failures have 
skewed the industry in a way that benefits private equity firms 
at the expense of investors. 
III.  PRIVATE EQUITY AS MARKET FAILURE   
As the preceding Part demonstrates, private equity’s gov-
ernance structure creates significant governance costs in the 
form of compensation-based moral hazard, limited governance 
rights, and differential treatment. This governance structure in-
centivizes excessive risk-taking by private equity firms, restricts 
the ability of investors to monitor bad behavior, and creates in-
tra-investor conflicts. 
Given the extent of governance costs associated with the pri-
vate equity structure, one might ask why investors put up with 
it. After all, in a world of freedom of contract, one might expect 
that investors would refuse to invest under these terms. Institu-
tional investors such as pension funds and endowments are so-
phisticated parties with repeat exposure to the private equity in-
dustry. If they negotiate these terms into the governance 
structure, or at least tacitly accept them, then perhaps we should 
conclude that the resulting governance structure is an efficient 
outcome.180 
This Part will argue that the market for private equity con-
tracts is inefficient for several reasons. First, private equity 
firms benefit from strong path-dependency effects that lock in 
current structures. Second, investors face collective-action prob-
 
 178. See id. at 2224 (outlining specific market conditions necessary for price 
discrimination to be economically favorable for a firm); see also B. CURTIS 
EATON & DIANE F. EATON, MICROECONOMICS 284 (1988) (explaining that price 
discrimination is only possible for firms with “some degree of market power”).  
 179. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in 
Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 474 (2002) (“Under standard theories of 
monopoly, with perfect information, firms would have an incentive to price dis-
criminate perfectly (extracting the full consumer surplus from each [con-
sumer]).”). 
 180. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 347 (discussing an “abstract 
belief that markets for corporate contract terms work efficiently”). 
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lems that inhibit cooperation. And finally, reputational con-
straints on private equity firms are not as powerful as many ob-
servers have assumed. 
A. PATH DEPENDENCE 
Under traditional economic theory, parties are expected to 
negotiate contracts that maximize the joint wealth of the parties, 
absent transaction costs.181 No rational party would reject a con-
tractual term that creates value as long as it can capture some 
portion of the surplus value. So, while specific contractual provi-
sions may benefit one side or the other, overall the nexus of con-
tracts should be expected to be efficient and value-creating. As 
such, one might presume that the private equity governance 
structure—which, after all, involves sophisticated parties will-
ing to invest substantial time and money into negotiating their 
investments—would come close to this ideal of efficient bargain-
ing and optimal contracts. 
But the efficient-bargaining hypothesis is based on certain 
assumptions about the nature of the contracts involved and the 
rationality of the actors that negotiate them. One important ex-
ception to its validity, and the focus of this Subsection, is the 
concept of path dependence. Path dependence refers generally to 
the idea that allocations or arrangements today are conditioned 
on past decisions.182 The paradigmatic example of path depend-
ence is the QWERTY keyboard.183 It was first designed as a way 
of preventing excessive jamming on typewriters, but once 
enough manufacturers had adopted the keyboard layout and 
enough typists had become proficient in using it, the costs of 
switching to another layout became excessively high.184 Typists, 
who had invested time and money learning how to type quickly 
and efficiently on the QWERTY keyboard, were leery of buying 
 
 181. See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and 
Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 118 (Cass R. Sunstein 
ed., 2000) (applying rational choice theory to argue that “contracting parties are 
assumed to compare the expected financial costs and benefits of alternative con-
tract terms and to base their preference on which term will provide the greatest 
differential of benefits over costs”).  
 182. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, 
and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 210 (1995) (“The use of path dependence 
in economics is [premised on the concept that allocations] . . . exhibit memory; 
they are conditioned on past decisions.”).  
 183. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 332 (1985). 
 184. Id. at 333–36. 
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keyboards that had different layouts, even when the initial ra-
tionale for the creation of the QWERTY keyboard (typewriters 
that jammed) ceased to exist.185 In essence, what was a historical 
accident became locked in by the initial choice of many manufac-
turers to adopt, and, thus, many typists to learn, the QWERTY 
keyboard.186 Today, the QWERTY keyboard is still dominant, 
even in an era of smartphones that never jam.187 
Contract terms also exhibit path dependence.188 Although 
perhaps not as vivid an example as QWERTY keyboards, stand-
ardized contract terms can benefit from increasing returns as 
more parties adopt the terms, and also entail switching costs 
once they are widely employed in an industry. For example, if a 
particular provision has been blessed by the courts as enforcea-
ble, or has a widely known interpretation in the industry, then 
adopting that term provides a level of certainty that may over-
ride concerns about whether the term is, in the abstract, the op-
timal language for the parties in any particular instance. Simi-
larly, the cost of reimagining and drafting contracts from scratch 
is substantially higher than merely using a precedent from a 
past deal. Standardized terms also benefit from the fact that 
many parties have scrutinized the terms, thereby reducing the 
room for errors or oversights in drafting contracts.189 
The key point here is that a contractual structure that is 
adopted at an initial time period can persist into future time pe-
riods, even if that contractual structure would not be the optimal 
structure for parties today if they were drafting from a tabula 
rasa. It could well be rational for parties to remain with the ini-
tial contractual structure because it provides certain ancillary 
benefits—often referred to as learning or network benefits—that 
the otherwise optimal, but new, structure does not. In other 
 
 185. Id. at 334–35. 
 186. Id. at 335–36. Some scholars have questioned whether QWERTY key-
boards provide a real-life application of path dependence, calling into doubt a 
number of elements of the story told above. See Stephen E. Margolis & S. J. 
Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOM-
ICS AND THE LAW 17, 17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 187. See The QWERTY Myth, ECONOMIST (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www 
.economist.com/node/196071 (noting that once a typist has “learned to type on a 
QWERTY keyboard, the cost of retraining . . . is not worth paying”). 
 188. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 348 (“[C]orporate contract 
terms can frequently offer ‘increasing returns’ as more firms employ the same 
contract term.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 
(1999). 
 189. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 350. 
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words, the ancillary benefits of staying the course with a previ-
ous contract structure may outweigh any benefits from switch-
ing to a better contract structure. 
Private equity governance structures exhibit many of the 
features we would expect to see if the industry were subject to 
strong path-dependence effects. The governance structure of pri-
vate equity firms demonstrates a surprising level of conformity 
on certain key terms, like the 2 and 20 compensation structure, 
and survived largely intact even after external shocks like the 
2008 financial crisis that forced many other alternative invest-
ment managers to radically rethink their business models.190 
The level of complexity of private equity contracts is high, thus 
increasing the costs of switching to new, untested contractual 
structures.191 The difficulty of restructuring these arrangements 
would involve extensive time and resources and would be subject 
to great uncertainty.192 
But it is important to note that the path dependence of pri-
vate equity’s governance structure does not depend solely on the 
increasing returns from standardization or the heavy switching 
costs. There are also deep behavioral reasons for individual ac-
tors to continue with these past arrangements even in the face 
of evidence that the arrangements are no longer optimal.193 
First, individuals concerned with their reputations have 
strong incentives to imitate the prior decisions of others in the 
field, a phenomenon called herd behavior.194 Both private equity 
managers and employees of institutional investors that are 
 
 190. Chris Flood, Private Equity Clings to “2 and 20” Fee Model, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/f7dc242c-58a9-11e6-9f70 
-badea1b336d4. 
 191. See David E. Hutchison, Understanding and Teaching Private Equity 
Structures: Modeling Real Estate Development Joint Venture Agreements, 11 J. 
ECON. & FIN. EDUC. 87, 87 (2012) (noting the complexity of private equity in-
vestments). 
 192. As one scholar has noted (albeit in a different context), over the last 
twenty years private equity’s acquisition contracts have seen only two signifi-
cant shifts (adding equity commitment letters and enhanced debt commitment 
letters). Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 481, 493–94 (2009). 
 193. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, 
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1216–1244 (2003). 
 194. See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Invest-
ment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (1990) (observing that “professional manag-
ers will ‘follow the herd’ if they are concerned about how others will assess their 
ability to make sound judgements”); see also Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, 
at 356 (finding that herd behavior occurs as a consequence of agents’ rational 
attempts to enhance their reputations). 
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tasked with negotiating governance structures want these struc-
tures to succeed (in the sense of realizing profits from their in-
vestments), but they also have a separate and personal interest 
in maintaining, or building, their own individual reputations. 
Sensitivity to reputational effects can lead to conservative be-
havior and a preference for the status quo. If managers innovate 
in their contracts and fail, their reputations will suffer. But if 
they fail as a result of doing what everyone else is doing, their 
reputations will not face the same harm because observers will 
be more likely to chalk the failure up to circumstances outside 
the individual’s control.195 Even if the same logic applies to suc-
cessful outcomes (that is, the market will reward individuals for 
innovations that succeed), risk-averse individual decision-mak-
ers normally do not weigh these benefits as heavily as the poten-
tial losses from failure.196 Thus the cost of innovation is high 
from the perspective of reputation-sensitive individuals.197 
Second, once a particular set of contractual and governance 
structures are in place, the parties may experience a status quo 
bias leading them to perpetuate current structures over alterna-
tive ones.198 The status quo bias, which has been illustrated in a 
number of contexts, leads individuals to prefer allocations or ar-
rangements that are viewed as the status quo over alternative 
 
 195. See Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 194, at 466 (discussing the relation-
ship between unpredictable components, profitability of investments, and herd 
decision-making as it pertains to reputational differences of managers). This 
phenomenon is closely linked with a separate behavioral trait, conformity bias, 
where individuals tend to conform their beliefs to those of other members of 
their peer groups. See SOLOMON E. ASCH, Forces in the Modification and Dis-
tortion of Judgments, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450, 483–94 (1952). 
 196. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 358 (noting that the “penalty 
for a bad outcome will often be disproportionately severe in comparison to [the] 
reward for a good outcome” in the context of standardized contract terms and 
herd mentality). 
 197. For a more extensive discussion of the obstacles to contractual innova-
tion, see generally John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in 
Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133 (2014). 
 198. See Korobkin, supra note 181, at 121–23 (discussing experiments con-
firming status quo biases in favor of a default term); Daniel Kahneman et al., 
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1325 (1990) (providing evidence from studies showing an instant endow-
ment effect exists—that the value individuals assign an object increases as soon 
as the individual is given the object); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, 
Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 47–48 (1988) 
(showing through a series of experiments that individuals disproportionately 
maintain current or previous decisions). 
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arrangements, all else equal.199 Here, where private equity 
structures have gained such a high level of uniformity, and thus 
are more likely to be viewed as default or status quo terms, the 
parties negotiating the terms of private equity investments can 
be expected to default towards maintaining those structures. 
Parties that have a strong interest in maintaining these struc-
tures, such as private equity firms, will also have an inherent 
bargaining advantage over others due to this status quo bias. 
Third, individuals are strongly susceptible to anchoring ef-
fects, providing yet another behavioral bias in favor of prevailing 
governance structures.200 A number of studies have shown that 
once initial reference points, or anchors, have been set, those an-
chors have a significant impact on parties’ judgments, and sub-
sequent adjustments from those anchoring points tend to be 
small and incremental. A famous example came from a study of 
housing price estimates.201 Participants were asked to estimate 
the value of a house (which they could visit and inspect).202 Par-
ticipants were also given an asking price for the house, which 
was not in fact the asking price for the house, but was instead 
either substantially higher or substantially lower than the real 
asking price.203 It turned out that participants who were given 
high fictional asking prices estimated the real value of the house 
to be higher than did participants who were given low fictional 
asking prices.204 The differences in valuation were stark: stu-
dents that were quoted $119,900 as the asking price estimated 
the house’s value at $116,833, while students that were quoted 
$149,900 as the asking price estimated it at $144,454.205 In the 
context of private equity, both numerical and nonnumerical an-
 
 199. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625 (1998). 
 200. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 13, at 362 (highlighting studies that 
confirm strong anchoring biases); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, 
Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective 
on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 84, 94–96 (1987) (describing a study of the anchoring effects of home 
prices); Eric A. Zacks, Contract Review: Cognitive Bias, Moral Hazard, and Sit-
uational Pressure, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 379, 394 (2015) (pro-
posing the initial draft of a contract may have an anchoring effect). 
 201. Northcraft & Neale, supra note 200, at 87, 92. 
 202. Id. at 87 (describing the methodology used in both studies). 
 203. Id. at 92 (referring to the listing price of properties used within the 
study). 
 204. Id. at 92–93. 
 205. Id. at 93 tbl.4. 
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choring points exist. The source of these anchors is not just pre-
vious deals (i.e., the governance structures of previous private 
equity funds), but also the prevalent practice in the industry of 
private equity firms providing the initial draft of governing doc-
uments. Thus, by the very fact that private equity firms are set-
ting initial expectations about governance structures, these gov-
ernance structures can anchor the negotiations in a way that 
ensures that changes will be small and marginal. The expecta-
tions of the parties will be affected deeply by the initial anchor 
points that are established. 
Finally, investors in private equity may suffer from an over-
confidence bias that leads them to underestimate the likelihood 
that unfavorable governing arrangements will in fact harm 
them. Overconfidence bias generally refers to the tendency of 
people to overestimate their abilities, their control over results, 
and the likelihood of positive outcomes.206 One classic example 
is that the vast majority of people believe that they are less likely 
to get divorced than the overall divorce rate suggests.207 Studies 
have shown that overconfidence bias is both pervasive and pow-
erful: it leads venture capitalists to overpay for startup invest-
ments,208 investors to believe that they can beat the market,209 
and CEOs to systematically overestimate the returns they can 
generate from takeovers.210 In much the same way, overconfi-
dence bias may explain why investors willingly accept private 
 
 206. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1051, 1091–95 (2000); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Defer-
ence: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 673, 689 (2005). 
 207. One study of marriage-license applicants found that, while respondents 
accurately estimated that approximately fifty percent of marriages will end in 
divorce, when asked about the likelihood of their own marriage ending in di-
vorce, the median response was zero percent. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, 
When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Di-
vorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993). 
 208. See Andrew L. Zacharakis & Dean A. Shepherd, The Nature of Infor-
mation and Overconfidence on Venture Capitalists’ Decision Making, 16 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 311, 311–12 (2001) (studying overconfidence in venture capitalists 
and discussing factors leading to this overconfidence). 
 209. David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” To Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 537, 555 (2006). 
 210. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 597, 624–25 (1989) (discussing manager optimism as a potential reason 
for overestimating a target company’s value); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey 
Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 
89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 42 (2008) (finding overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
make lower-quality acquisitions). 
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equity’s costly governance structures. If they underestimate the 
probability of conflict, they will underprioritize protective provi-
sions in governing documents.211 If they overestimate the re-
turns from their investment, they will be more likely to accept 
high fees from private equity firms. Two additional factors sug-
gest that private equity investors are particularly susceptible to 
overconfidence bias. First, studies have shown that the bias is 
especially powerful when a decision appears to be supported by 
a group consensus and when decisions must be made quickly, 
precisely the conditions that prevail in many private equity con-
texts.212 Second, the fact that limited-partner investors are so-
phisticated investors with substantial resources and devoted 
personnel exacerbates the problem: overconfidence effects are 
generally greater in experts than in novices.213 
For all of these reasons, private equity firms benefit from 
strong path dependence effects that work to entrench current 
governance structures. Far from being the result of efficient bar-
gaining between investors and firms, private equity agreements 
are strongly influenced by the lingering effects of history. 
B. COOPERATION PROBLEMS 
A separate reason for the persistence of private equity’s 
structure in the face of evident governance costs is the difficulty 
of coordinating investor action to press for change. Cooperation 
problems have long been recognized as a source of agency costs 
in public corporations,214 but they have received less study in the 
context of private equity. And yet they are arguably a greater 
source of agency costs in private equity than they are in public 
corporations, for at least two reasons: bilateral bargaining and 
alternative investments. 
 
 211. See Kristen M. Blankley, The Ethics and Practice of Drafting Pre-Dis-
pute Resolution Clauses, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 743, 763 (2016) (explaining an 
optimistic overconfidence bias may prevent parties from negotiating alternative 
dispute resolution clauses in contracts); Russell Korobkin, Psychological Imped-
iments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 
281, 295 (2006) (finding that while lawyers in mediation recognize bias, most 
are unwilling to concede they are biased). 
 212. Ruben Orive, Group Consensus, Action Immediacy, and Opinion Confi-
dence, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 573, 573 (1988). 
 213. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial 
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 498 (2002). 
 214. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 131 (2008) (discussing challenges to ensuring good corporate 
governance for corporations with widely dispersed individual shareholders). 
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Let us assume that investors in private equity firms would 
prefer to have lower fees, greater governance rights, and easier 
exit mechanisms. These changes to the private equity structure 
might cut into private equity firms’ profits, but if investors col-
lectively demanded them, then private equity firms would be 
forced to concede. Why, then, would investors not cooperate to 
demand these changes? 
The first reason is that large investors now increasingly 
have the option to negotiate side agreements that grant them 
special treatment.215 If an investor has the option to achieve its 
aims through bilateral bargaining, or alternatively through 
costly multiparty negotiations that can tend toward compromise 
and lowest-common-denominator positions, it will likely opt for 
the former absent some compelling external rationale.216 Adding 
to this problem is that investors might well prefer to have other 
investors not share in the greater governance rights that they 
manage to negotiate: an investor could benefit from the stability 
provided by having other investors locked in to their invest-
ments, let alone the additional fees paid by unpreferred inves-
tors. Thus the rise of bilateral bargaining has reduced the incen-
tive for investors to cooperate in demanding changes to 
suboptimal governance structures.217  
Another kind of cooperation problem arises from the exist-
ence of multiple funds under a single private equity firm’s um-
brella. Private equity firms today often raise multiple funds, 
with each fund having its own set of investors and its own set of 
portfolio companies.218 The multiple fund structure provides in-
vestors with a high level of customizability, allowing them to in-
vest in only the funds that they believe are the best fit, but it 
also creates a conflict of interest.219 Private equity firms have 
 
 215. See discussion in supra Part II.C. 
 216. See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A 
Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 
14–18 (2003) (proposing that due to the possibility of parties having a veto 
power in multiparty negotiations, side deals may be needed to ensure a zone of 
possible agreement is available). 
 217. Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Ex-
plaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 
(1998) (explaining why the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties has re-
duced cooperation among least developed countries); William Magnuson, Uni-
lateral Corporate Regulation, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 521 (2017) (analyzing the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of multilateral and unilateral action). 
 218. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 25, at 46–47 (describing the 
potential conflicts that arise when private equity firms oversee multiple funds). 
 219. Id. 
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limited institutional capacities for identifying, monitoring, and 
managing the investments that make up their funds. If a private 
equity firm has two funds, one with general partner (GP)-
friendly terms and one with GP-unfriendly terms,220 the private 
equity firm will have strong incentives to devote more time and 
energy to the fund that has GP-friendly terms, all else equal. Af-
ter all, if one fund grants the private equity firm a right to 
twenty-five percent of the profits from investments, while the 
other fund grants the firm only fifteen percent, the private eq-
uity firm would rationally direct more promising portfolio com-
panies into the GP-friendly fund and devote more resources to 
enhancing its profits.221 Limited-partner investors, recognizing 
this dynamic, have little incentive to push for more investor-
friendly terms in their own fund unless they can be ensured that 
the investors in other funds also have similar terms.  
Both of these problems (bilateral bargaining and multiple 
funds) create situations that closely resemble the classic pris-
oner’s dilemma.222 Jointly, the parties would be better off if they 
could cooperate, but separately, each party has an incentive to 
defect and reap the rewards.223 In the real world, many pris-
oner’s dilemma–type situations are resolved because interac-
tions are repeated, outcomes are observed, and cheating can be 
 
 220. A GP-friendly term is a term that favors the interests of the GP over 
those of the limited partners. A GP-unfriendly term is a term that favors the 
interests of the limited partners over those of the general partner. Higher man-
agement fees, for example, would be GP-friendly, while lower ones would be GP-
unfriendly. 
 221. This dynamic is more than just theoretical. Studies have shown that 
the inclusion of GP-friendly terms in private equity governance documents af-
fect fund performance and behavior, including the efforts that private equity 
firms expend on their investments, the riskiness of investments that funds 
make, and the timing of exits from those investments.  Niklas Hüther, Is the 
Whole Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Behavioral Effects of Management 
Compensation (Sept. 18, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www 
.fmaconferences.org/Nashville/Papers/sum_of_parts_nh.pdf; Niklas Hüther et 
al., Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Management Con-
tracts 18–20 (Feb. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rhsmith 
.umd.edu/files/Documents/Departments/Finance/seminarspring2015/robinson 
.pdf (finding better investment performance for funds that include GP-friendly 
deal-by-deal contracts, suggesting this could be due to higher-risk investments 
throughout the fund’s life and due to a reduced incentive for general partners 
to exit early). 
 222. For a comprehensive description of large prisoner ’s dilemma situations, 
see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITU-
TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 3–5 (1990). 
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punished.224 But with private equity, all of these conditions are 
dubious. Interactions are much less frequent (once an investor 
has committed to a fund, its capital is tied up for the duration of 
the fund, which is often ten to twelve years).225 Outcomes are 
harder to observe: private equity firms often do not disclose the 
terms of side deals they reach with individual investors, or the 
structure of other funds.226 And finally, even the identity of other 
investors is often confidential.227 So, even if an investor deter-
mines that other investors have cheated and negotiated better 
terms on their own, it is unclear how punishment could be meted 
out. All of these difficulties highlight the magnitude of the coop-
eration problems that investors face in their investment deci-
sions.  
C. REPUTATION 
As the previous Sections have demonstrated, private equity 
firms have interests that do not fully align with those of their 
investors, and the investors have little ability to monitor and 
control the actions of the firms in order to deter misbehavior. 
This creates strong agency costs and may incentivize excessive 
risk-taking and rent-extraction by private equity firms to the 
detriment of investors. Despite the governance costs created by 
current private equity models, there are strong currents pushing 
against reform. Both path-dependence effects and cooperation 
problems contribute to entrenching current governance struc-
tures in place. Which brings us to one final constraint on private 
equity behavior: reputation.228 
 
 224. For a formal description of the conditions necessary for cooperation to 
evolve, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 164–72 
(1994); JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 260–79 
(1994). 
 225. Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity 
Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1071, 1086 n.31 (2008). 
 226. For a discussion of the lengths to which private equity firms go to main-
tain the confidentiality of their agreements, see Gretchen Morgenson, Behind 
Private Equity’s Curtain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/10/19/business/retirement/behind-private-equitys-curtain.html. 
 227. CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 115, at 63. 
 228. For a discussion of the importance of reputation to private equity firms 
and the ways that private equity firms use their reputations in the debt mar-
kets, see de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 134–39. 
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It is often said that reputation serves as a powerful con-
straint on private equity firm behavior.229 Firms raise new funds 
regularly, and if they earn a reputation for mistreating their in-
vestors, they will find it difficult to find new investors willing to 
commit their capital to them.230 Thus private equity firms should 
value their reputations highly and seek to avoid actions that 
would damage those reputations. So, even if investors commit 
their capital to private equity firms carte blanche, the argument 
goes, they can take comfort in the fact that firms have nonlegal 
incentives to maximize investor value even in the absence of ex-
plicit contractual constraints.231 
But there are reasons to doubt that reputation is as effective 
a mechanism in private equity as many make it out it to be.232 
First, reputation can only constrain a party’s behavior if the 
party believes that others will receive information about the 
party’s past behavior and base their decision making on that 
past behavior.233 In other words, reputation is only as good as 
the information that underlies it.  
As amply discussed in previous sections, the private equity 
industry is built around tightly controlled flows of infor-
mation.234 Private equity firms rarely make information about 
their investments and governance structures available to the 
public.235 They also tightly control the flow of information to 
their own investors.236 In this atmosphere of extreme confiden-
tiality, it is unsurprising that a number of studies have found 
 
 229. See Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in 
Private Equity Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L. 565, 565 (2015) 
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 230. Id. at 575–76. 
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utations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Qual-
ity), 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 18 (1996). 
 234. See discussion in supra Part II.B.3. 
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that private equity firm disclosures systematically tend to over-
state fund performance.237 This noise surrounding information 
about past performance renders it difficult for current investors, 
let alone potential investors, to identify and accurately assess in-
formation about private equity firm behavior. Of course, in egre-
gious cases of misbehavior by private equity firms, such as out-
right fraud or theft, the information may well come out,238 but in 
other cases of less severity (for example, less than diligent mon-
itoring or marginally higher than expected fees), past misbehav-
ior may be overwhelmed by other, optimistic information dis-
closed by the fund. 
Second, reputation is not a monolithic trait. Private equity 
firms do not have purely good or purely bad reputations. They 
have reputations for possessing certain traits and taking certain 
actions. Some have reputations for industrial expertise: Silver 
Lake, for example, is known for its deep expertise in the technol-
ogy sector,239 while EnCap Investments is known for its oil and 
gas investments.240 Private equity firms also have different rep-
utations with different audiences. For example, private equity 
firms care deeply about their reputation with banks, as their ac-
quisition model is premised on the ability to receive loans at low 
interest rates.241 Thus they have an interest in not defaulting on 
their debts, as doing so will make it more difficult to access the 
debt markets in their next funding round. They also care about 
their reputation with target companies, as they regularly buy 
companies and participate in auctions for companies.242 Thus 
they have an interest in not backing out of acquisition agree-
ments with target companies, as doing so will make them less 
 
 237. See, e.g., Douglas Cumming et al., International Private Equity Valua-
tion and Disclosure, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 617, 641 (2009); Douglas Cum-
ming & Uwe Walz, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure Around the World, 41 
J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 727, 751 (2010). 
 238. For example, in the SEC’s investigation of Apollo Global’s fee practices, 
it came to light that one of Apollo’s executives was twice caught “improperly 
charging personal items and services” to Apollo’s investors. See Protess, supra 
note 153.  
 239. See Amy Or, Neuberger Berman’s Dyal Capital Takes Minority Stake in 
Silver Lake, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/neuberger 
-bermans-dyal-capital-takes-minority-stake-in-silver-lake-1468366758. 
 240. See Sabrina Willmer, EnCap Investments Said To Seek $5 Billion for 
Energy Fund, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-10-22/encap-investments-said-to-seek-5-billion-for-energy 
-fund. 
 241. See de Fontenay, supra note 41, at 134–39. 
 242. For a discussion of the role of reputation in constraining private equity 
behavior vis-à-vis target companies, see Cain et al., supra note 229, at 578–79. 
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credible partners for potential targets. 
Given the multiplicity of reputations that private equity 
firms maintain, it is unclear whether, in any given case, private 
equity firms will place greater value on their reputation vis-à-
vis investors than their reputation vis-à-vis creditors, targets, or 
along any of the many other dimensions of reputation. It is not 
difficult to imagine that these reputations may sometimes con-
flict. For example, it may at times make sense for portfolio com-
panies to default on their loans, but private equity firms, cher-
ishing their reputations with banks, may refuse to do so if they 
fear that it will make future capital raises more difficult. Or, it 
may make sense for a fund to back out of a merger agreement 
with a target if the market has shifted and the deal no longer 
looks like a profitable one, but a private equity firm may refuse 
to terminate the agreement if doing so will make it more difficult 
for its other funds to close their deals. The point here is not that 
a private equity firm’s reputation with investors is unimportant, 
but rather that it is one set of a larger set of reputations that 
private equity firms seek to maintain, and that in many cases, it 
may well be overlooked in favor of maximizing these other repu-
tations. Thus blanket assertions that investors can rest assured 
that, whatever their contractual protections, reputation will en-
sure that private equity firms seek to maximize investor wealth, 
are overstated.243 
One final reason why reputation may be ineffective in con-
straining private equity firm behavior is that individual deci-
sion-makers within firms often have interests that diverge from 
those of the firm itself. It is well known that reputational con-
straints on misbehavior often break down in endgame scenarios: 
that is, if an individual knows that he will never need to interact 
with a counterparty again, he is more likely to cheat and pocket 
one-time gains at the expense of the counterparty.244 After all, 
reputation is only valuable to the extent it can be used in the 
future. This incentive is amplified when gains from misbehavior 
are large and the costs are uncertain or not fully internalized.245 
 
 243. See id. at 593–94 (finding beyond certain boundaries, reputation is not 
a sufficient enforcement mechanism). 
 244. Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 187, 191 (1988); see David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation 
in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RA-
TIONALITY & SOC’Y 58, 65 (1995) (noting “defection is certain on the last trial” 
in a finitely repeated prisoner ’s dilemma). 
 245. See Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, On the Evolution of Collective En-
forcement Institutions: Communities and Courts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 389–
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In the context of private equity, while private equity firms them-
selves may have indefinite time horizons, the individual manag-
ers do not. Managers retire, they change jobs, and they have 
other interests. For all these reasons, the reputational incentives 
of individual managers are not fully aligned with those of the 
firm where they work. Given the stratospheric levels of compen-
sation prevalent in today’s private equity industry,246 these in-
centives can sharply skew the interests of individual managers 
to the detriment of investors. Even if the manager misbehaves 
in a way that damages the firm’s reputation, the manager him-
self, who has limited time horizons, will not fully internalize the 
cost of this harm. The rewards to individuals from excessive risk-
taking are so high, and the costs are so uncertain, that managers 
may well adopt strategies that do not align with the interests of 
their investors. 
* * * * * 
This Part has argued that private equity’s governance costs, 
far from being the result of efficient bargaining between sophis-
ticated parties, are instead the result of market failures at the 
heart of the industry. Private equity structures exhibit strong 
path dependence, resisting reform even in the face of dramatic 
changes in the market. They also create collective-action prob-
lems for investors, who face steep obstacles to cooperating in ef-
forts to pressure private equity firms to change their ways. Fi-
nally, reputation is not an effective bulwark against 
opportunistic behavior by private equity firms, given the varie-
gated content of that reputation and the differing reputational 
incentives of particular individuals that make up the firm. The 
next Part will take up a final question: what steps can be taken 
to improve private equity’s governance structure? 
IV.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS   
The governance structure of private equity creates a number 
of pernicious misalignments between the interests of private eq-
uity firms and their investors. These misalignments include 
compensation that incentivizes excessive risk-taking, governing 
documents that strongly constrain the rights of investors, and 
 
91 (2014) (predicting a shift from informal community enforcement to formal 
court enforcement “as the value of trade between distant or dissimilar transac-
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 1904 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1847 
 
opportunities for disparate treatment between favored and dis-
favored partners.247 While the contract terms of privately nego-
tiated agreements might not typically be a matter of public im-
portance, we have a strong reason to care about the plight of 
private equity investors, namely, that the majority of private eq-
uity investors are pension funds, endowments, and sovereign 
wealth funds, who handle money for the benefit of the public.248 
Thus private equity’s governance costs are in a real way public 
costs. We should care deeply about resolving them. To that end, 
this Part sets forth several proposals for improving the corporate 
governance of private equity and mechanisms for implementing 
those changes.  
A. GOVERNANCE CHANGES 
Two general governance changes present themselves. The 
first focuses on the particular governance costs of private equity 
and attempts to reach better substantive outcomes in these ar-
eas. The second focuses on the process and procedure of arriving 
at negotiated agreements and attempts to fix the breakdowns in 
process that lead to these suboptimal results. The benefit of the 
first, substance-based approach is that it directly addresses the 
fundamental misalignments between management and investor 
interests. The benefit of the second, process-based approach is 
that it refrains from imposing external rules of behavior on pri-
vately negotiated deals and instead creates environments more 
conducive to efficient bargaining.249 
1. Improving Outcomes 
Several substantive reforms could reduce private equity’s 
governance costs. First, private equity structures could be re-
vised to skew private equity firm compensation in favor of pure 
equity interests in their funds, as opposed to management fees 
and carried interests. As described above, management fees cre-
ate an incentive for firms to raise as much capital as possible, 
regardless of the reasonable possibilities for its investment, and 
 
 247. See supra Part II. 
 248. See INSTITUTIONAL LTD. PARTNERS ASS’N, THE POWER OF THE NET-
WORK: 2015 ILPA ANNUAL REPORT 15 (documenting consistent membership 
growth). 
 249. These two approaches bear similarities to the command-and-control 
versus market-based approaches to regulation. See Thomas W. Merrill, Explain-
ing Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275. However, as will be explained 
further below, it may be possible to mitigate private equity’s governance costs 
through changes implemented outside of traditional legislative action. 
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then, at the end of the investment period, to ensure that as much 
of that capital is actually used to acquire companies, regardless 
of the reasonable possibilities of profits on the acquisitions.250 
Carried interests also create strong incentives for private equity 
firms to take excessive risk, as private equity firms capture 
much of the upside from profitable undertakings, while bearing 
none of the downside in the case of loss.251 Pure equity inter-
ests—that is, a percentage ownership of the partnership inter-
ests in the private equity fund—more closely align the interests 
of private equity firms with the interests of their investors, as 
they require private equity firms to share in the upside and 
downside of their investments.252 
Second, private equity structures could be reformed to grant 
limited-partner investors greater governance rights, including 
voting, transfer, and information rights. Investors would not 
necessarily need broad governance rights in all of these areas in 
order to ensure that they are protected from misbehavior or 
shirking by private equity firms. Instead, greater governance 
rights in one area might obviate the need for greater governance 
rights in another. For example, voice (voting rights) could serve 
as an effective substitute for exit (transfer rights),253 and thus if 
investors have a liquid market in which to dispose of their inter-
est in private equity funds, they might not need strong rights to 
vote on fundamental business matters, and vice-versa.254  
Third, private equity structures could be changed to require 
private equity firms to grant equal treatment to all investors. 
This requirement, while certainly far from the norm, is not as 
foreign a concept as it might appear at first blush. Private equity 
firms already grant many favored investors so-called most-fa-
vored-nation provisions in their side letters, thereby ensuring 
that these investors can benefit from any privileges or rights 
that the firms grant other investors.255 Extending most-favored-
nation status to all investors would resolve many of the problems 
associated with preferential treatment and would allow less so-
phisticated investors to benefit from the expertise of more so-
phisticated ones. 
 
 250. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 251. For further discussion, see supra Part II.A.2. 
 252. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 262–64. 
 253. Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2014). 
 254. See Coffee, supra note 138, at 1281–82 (discussing the potential trade-
off between liquidity and control). 
 255. Volet, supra note 167. 
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2. Improving Information 
A separate approach to mitigating private equity’s govern-
ance costs would be to improve the information provided to in-
vestors. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that enduring change could 
be achieved in the private equity industry without more and bet-
ter disclosure to investors. The SEC has repeatedly fined private 
equity firms (including many of the largest and most prestigious 
firms) for improperly disclosing fees and expenses to inves-
tors.256 Basic and accurate information about the compensation 
of private equity firms and the expenses charged to investors is 
an essential part of reforming private equity’s structure. But it 
is not enough. 
In order for investors to assess the risks of their investment, 
and to mitigate agency costs, investors must be provided with 
full information about partnership terms, side arrangements (if 
any), and fund activities and performance. Such information 
might require changes to the confidentiality provisions in many 
limited partnership agreements today.257 But without such in-
formation, governance rights could be neutered by limited dis-
closure.258 Better information would lead to better monitoring, 
allowing investors to observe the behavior of private equity firms 
and identify misconduct.259 
Just as importantly, a more accurate and comprehensive 
disclosure regime would improve the quality of the bargaining 
process in private equity. By reducing the problems of asymmet-
ric information that bedevil current negotiating frameworks, 
greater information about fund structures can help ensure that 
bargaining achieves efficient outcomes. Efficient bargaining is 
based on the premise that both sides understand the costs and 
benefits of the terms that they are negotiating over. If one side 
cannot accurately assess its potential gains and losses, the bar-
gaining process can break down, leading to inefficient, one-sided 
 
 256. Protess, supra note 153.  
 257. For an example limited partnership agreement, see CUMMING & JO-
HAN, supra note 115, at 63–64. 
 258. See Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corpo-
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agreements.260 Full disclosure would require both the terms and 
conditions of the particular investor’s investment, but also any 
side arrangements or special treatment of other investors, as 
well as any potential conflicts of interest with other funds. These 
sorts of disclosures have been widely recommended in the con-
text of investment banks and should be extended to private eq-
uity as well.261 
B. MECHANISMS FOR CHANGE 
These proposed governance changes could greatly improve 
the alignment of interests between private equity firms and their 
investors and thereby reduce private equity’s governance costs. 
But given that private equity’s governance structure has been 
stubbornly resistant to change, the question arises what mecha-
nisms can be used to promote change in the industry. Three an-
swers present themselves. 
The first is regulation. When markets are not functioning 
properly, governments often step in to correct market failures 
and create incentives for socially optimal behavior.262 This was 
the impetus behind Dodd-Frank, the sweeping reform of Wall 
Street that followed the 2008 financial crisis.263 A Dodd-Frank 
for Private Equity would institute more comprehensive regula-
tion of the financial incentives and disclosure requirements of 
private equity firms, and likewise include investor protection re-
forms intended to ensure that limited partner investors are not 
saddled with oppressive restrictions. But just as Dodd-Frank 
was criticized for imposing excessive compliance costs on banks, 
regulatory reform of the private equity industry risks weighing 
down an industry that is heavily dependent on streamlining and 
efficiency.264 The difficulty is finding a form of regulation that 
 
 260. See Joseph L. Lemon, Jr., Don’t Let Me Down (Round): Avoiding Illu-
sory Terms in Venture Capital Financing in the Post-Internet Bubble Era, 
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reduces private equity’s governance costs without burdening 
firms with costly and unnecessary red tape. 
Which leads to the second mechanism for inducing change: 
namely, greater investor cooperation. In order to overcome the 
path dependence and anchoring effects that have hardwired cur-
rent governance structures in place, large limited-partner inves-
tors could come together to coordinate investment policies, by, 
for example, promulgating model private equity governance 
terms or template limited partnership agreements. While not 
having the force of law, these best practices would, at a mini-
mum, provide strong social reasons for changing current struc-
tures. They would show that other investors believed these ap-
proaches to be optimal,265 and they would provide reassurance 
that any provisions included in the model terms had received 
close attention and scrutiny by top practitioners in the field.266 
If a few large investors, such as CalPERS267 and Teachers Re-
tirement System of Texas,268 adopted these forms as their stand-
ard documents, they could provide smaller investors with much-
needed leverage in the negotiation process. Just as importantly, 
these private-sector efforts could serve as an alternative to and 
a guidepost for public sector regulation. 
A third and final mechanism for instigating change is infor-
mation intermediaries.269 Private equity firms have interests 
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that do not always align with those of their investors, and the 
reputational constraints on their misconduct are not as robust 
as one might hope. But there are ways to make reputation play 
a stronger role in improving private equity’s governance without 
relying solely on the reputation of the private equity firm itself. 
Independent information intermediaries, such as ratings agen-
cies or third-party consultants and advisors, could step in to help 
align the interests of private equity firms and investors by stak-
ing their own reputations on successful outcomes.270 They could 
examine firm management, fund structures, and compensation 
incentives to provide an independent analysis of the quality of 
fund investments to potential limited partners.271 The success of 
these information intermediaries would depend directly on their 
reputation for accurately assessing fund structures, and thus 
their reputation would not be fragmented and conflicted in the 
ways that private equity firm reputation is. Just as proxy advi-
sors today have significant influence on the investment decisions 
of institutional investors, and thus place strong pressure on com-
panies to adopt more investor-friendly governance practices,272 
information intermediaries in the private equity sphere could 
serve as a strong force for improved governance structures. 
These three mechanisms for reform—regulation, investor 
cooperation, and information intermediation—could serve to 
 
Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2269–71 
(1999). 
 270. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Regulating Informational Intermediation, 
1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 58, 58–59 (2011) (listing various types of informational 
intermediaries). 
 271. One might ask why limited-partner investors are not sufficiently so-
phisticated to perform this analysis themselves. While one might hope that 
large institutional investors would have the capacity to assess the costs and 
benefits of their investments, in practice they often rely on the advice of special-
ists in making their investment decisions, in effect outsourcing many invest-
ment decisions to outside experts. See Legislative Proposals To Enhance Capital 
Formation, Transparency, and Regulatory Accountability: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of the Society of Corporate Secretaries 
& Governance Professionals and the National Investor Relations Institute), 
https://www.niri.org/NIRI/media/NIRI/Advocacy/Society-NIRI-Statement-to 
-HFSC-Subcommittee-Proxy-Advisory-Firm-Reform-Act-FINAL-VERSION-5 
-25-2016.pdf (concluding that “[p]roxy advisory firms exert undue influence in 
the proxy voting process, as they generate voting recommendations for their 
clients, and, in fact, make voting decisions for some of their clients”). 
 272. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 
906 (2007) (explaining types of pressure the corporate governance industry may 
put on companies). 
 1910 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1847 
 
overcome the forces that have entrenched private equity’s prob-
lematic governance structure. In doing so, they might lead to im-
portant, and beneficial, changes in the way that the private eq-
uity industry works. 
  CONCLUSION   
It is often argued that private equity’s success can be best 
explained as a result of its uniquely beneficial governance struc-
ture, one that reduces agency costs to a minimum and closely 
aligns the interests of management and ownership. This Article 
has argued that private equity’s so-called governance dividend 
is overstated and that, in fact, private equity’s structure creates 
a number of intractable governance costs. These governance 
costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive 
risk-taking by private equity firms, minimal governance rights 
for investors, and opportunities for favoritism and discrimina-
tion. We should care deeply about these costs because the public 
is heavily invested in private equity, through pension funds, en-
dowments, and sovereign wealth funds. This Article has sug-
gested a number of reforms—from improving information flows 
to reducing conflicts of interest—that could help improve private 
equity’s governance structure, but it is hoped that these sugges-
tions are merely a starting point of a longer conversation. 
